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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, HATE 
SPEECH, AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY:  
A REPLY 
James Weinstein* 
INTRODUCTION 
In my Opening Article I explored the potential of 
“upstream” speech restrictions to undermine the political 
legitimacy of “downstream” laws.1 Using hate speech bans as an 
example, I argued that these restrictions had the potential to 
seriously compromise, and in some cases even annihilate, the 
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws as applied to those whose 
ability to publicly object to these downstream laws had been 
impaired by the speech bans. Professor Jeremy Waldron, whose 
criticism of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s and my previous and 
rather cursory presentations of this proposition inspired me to 
more fully explore and develop this position, wrote a response to 
my Opening Article.2 A group of distinguished scholars from 
several nations and working in various disciplines then 
commented on this discussion.3 
 
 * Dan Cracchiolo Chair in Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law, Arizona State University. I am grateful to Trevor Allan, Dick Arenson, Jill Hasday, 
Jeff Murphy, Robert Post, Jake Rowbottom, Fred Schauer, Mary Sigler, Cynthia 
Stonnington, Wayne Sumner for their helpful comments and to James Hall, Luci Davis, 
and Austin Yost for their valuable research assistance. 
 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017). 
 2. Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy of Legitimacy: A Response to 
James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2017). 
 3. Vincent Blasi, Hate Speech, Public Assurance, and the Civic Standing of 
Speakers and Victims, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 585 (2017); Alexander Brown, Hate Speech 
Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 
599 (2017); Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech—Definitions and Empirical Evidence, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 619 (2017); Eric Heinze, Taking Legitimacy Seriously: A Return to 
Deontology, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 631 (2017); Robert Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech, 
32 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2017); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and Obedience to 
Law, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 661 (2017); Steven H. Shiffrin, Hate Speech, Legitimacy, and 
the Foundational Principles of Government, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 675 (2017); Adrienne 
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Admirably fulfilling his role as my principal interlocutor, 
Waldron filed a vigorous and comprehensive conceptual 
challenge to the position that upstream speech restrictions can 
deprive downstream laws of legitimacy. Although none of the 
commentators fully embraced Waldron’s wholesale rejection of 
my position, several offered trenchant challenges to some 
specific aspects of my argument. But the brunt of the 
disagreement with my Opening Article was empirical and 
related specifically to hate speech. Several commentators 
thought that I exaggerated the extent of the restriction that hate 
speech bans had placed on the ability of people to oppose 
antidiscrimination measures. They also claimed that I 
underestimated the effect on legitimacy resulting from hate 
speech itself. There was also vigorous disagreement about the 
appropriate legal response in a state of uncertainty about the 
harmful effects of hate speech. 
In this Reply I will address both the general criticism of my 
view that viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse can 
deprive downstream laws of legitimacy, as well as the specific 
criticism of my claims about the detrimental effect on the 
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws resulting from hate speech 
bans. But before doing so, I think it might be helpful to explain 
why I chose hate speech as the exemplar of speech restrictions 
with the potential to undermine the legitimacy of downstream 
laws. I will also address a concern raised by Professor Frederick 
Schauer about this choice. 
To explore the idea that upstream speech restrictions can 
impair the legitimacy of downstream laws, I focused on hate 
speech bans for several reasons. First, I was aware of no other 
type of speech restriction commonly applied (or misapplied) in 
liberal democracies as likely to have this effect. In addition, as 
just mentioned, the first person to critically engage the 
proposition that a speech restriction could deprive a downstream 
law of legitimacy was Waldron, who did so in two works 
defending narrow restrictions on hate speech.4 Finally, as 
 
Stone, Viewpoint Discrimination, Hate Speech Laws, and the Double-Sided Nature of 
Freedom of Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 687 (2017). 
 4. Jeremy Waldron, Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy [hereinafter Waldron, 
Political Legitimacy], in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 329, 339–40 
n.43 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012); JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN 
HATE SPEECH (2012) [hereinafter WALDRON, HATE SPEECH]. 
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Professor Vincent Blasi appreciates in his Commentary, I was 
concerned that hate speech bans enacted to protect members of 
vulnerable minorities may have the perverse effect of impairing 
the legitimacy of antidiscrimination measures enacted to protect 
these same individuals.5 
In his Commentary, Professor Schauer expresses the 
concern that the focus on hate speech restrictions risks that “the 
analysis of interesting and important questions about the 
relationship between political legitimacy and freedom of speech 
will be both crowded out and distorted” by this contentious 
subject.6 Schauer’s fear has, at least to some extent, materialized: 
the discussion has morphed into one in which the propriety of 
hate speech bans in liberal democratic societies has assumed 
equal billing with the relationship between free speech and 
political legitimacy. This shift in emphasis has undoubtedly, as 
Schauer predicted, resulted in a somewhat less sharp focus on 
the relationship between free speech and legitimacy than I had 
hoped for. On the other hand, this development may at the same 
time have been beneficial if, as two commentators have claimed, 
examining hate speech regulation through the lens of political 
legitimacy has moved the stale and stalled discussion of 
propriety of hate speech in a novel and helpful direction.7 In Part 
I of this Reply I will try to mitigate the problem that Schauer 
identified by addressing with as few references to hate speech as 
possible Waldron’s largely conceptual objection to my argument. 
I will also reply to some more specific objections to the view that 
speech restrictions can rob downstream laws of legitimacy. I will 
then in Part II reply to various criticisms of my argument that 
hate speech restrictions as they actually operate in many 
democratic societies have undermined the legitimacy of 
antidiscrimination measures. 
 
 5. Blasi, supra note 3, at 590-91. 
 6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 665. 
 7. See Blasi, supra note 3, at 585 (In “open[ing] up a promising line of inquiry 
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of hate speech regulation” this discussion has 
“succeeded in reinvigorating a subject that [has] grown academically formulaic even 
while becoming alarmingly more salient politically and culturally.”); Stone, supra note 3, 
at 687 (“The essays to which we are responding take the long and rather well-worn 
debate about hate speech in new directions.”). 
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I. CHALLENGES TO THE CLAIM THAT UPSTREAM 
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS CAN DEPRIVE DOWNSTREAM 
LEGISLATION OF LEGITIMACY 
A. WALDRON’S CRITIQUE OF THE CLAIM THAT UPSTREAM 
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS CAN RENDER IMMORAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF DOWNSTREAM LEGISLATION 
As already noted, Waldron is the only participant in this 
Symposium to file a wholesale challenge to the position that 
speech restrictions can impair, and in some instances even 
destroy,8 the legitimacy of a downstream legislation as applied to 
citizens whose ability to speak out against the legislation was 
impaired by the speech restriction. It should be noted, however, 
that Waldron challenges only the normative aspect of my claim. 
He does not take issue with the contention that upstream speech 
restriction can have a detrimental effect on the descriptive 
legitimacy of downstream legislation. 
The idea that I developed and defended in my Opening 
Article concerning the downstream effect of upstream speech 
restrictions was a novel one, apparently more so than I 
appreciated,9 and as such, required rigorous testing. I am 
 
 8. Waldron is mistaken that I agree with what he characterizes as Dworkin’s 
concession that the potential effect of a speech restriction on legitimacy “was diminution 
rather than destruction” of downstream legislation. Waldron, supra note 2, at 705. First 
of all, Waldron may be over reading the extent of Dworkin’s concession. In agreeing 
that, despite the restrictions on political expression imposed by its upstream restrictions 
on hate speech, “[o]n balance Britain is entitled to enforce” its downstream 
antidiscrimination laws, Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335 (quoting 
email from Ronald Dworkin to Jeremy Waldron, Oct. 4, 2009, 21:34 EST (on file with 
Waldron)), Dworkin did not necessarily concede that under no circumstances could a 
speech restriction destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law. Rather, I read Dworkin as 
leaving this possibility open. In any event, this was precisely the question that I explored 
in my Opening Article and contrary to Waldron, as shown in my Evangelical 
Photographer Scenario, Weinstein, supra note 1, at 567, I do believe that under certain 
circumstances such destruction is possible. Waldron is correct, however, in observing that 
in my view for a speech restriction to destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law there 
must already be other difficulties with the morality of enforcing the downstream law. 
Waldron, supra note 2, at 706. I should add that if Dworkin was referring, as Waldron 
dubiously claims he was (see infra note 9), to the inability of a single hate speech law to 
destroy the legitimacy of the entire legal system, then I, of course, agree that it cannot. 
See text accompanying note 43, infra. 
 9. Until reading Waldron’s response, I thought my position regarding the effect 
that speech restrictions might have on political legitimacy was essentially the same as 
Dworkin’s. Waldron, however, considers my position in two crucial respects more 
“modest” and “focused” than Dworkin’s and thus more defensible. Waldron, supra note 
2, at 705–06. First, he thinks that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech 
restrictions not on particular downstream legislation, as I am, but with its effect on 
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therefore most grateful to Waldron for providing a thoughtful, 
comprehensive, and vigorous critique of this position. As a 
preliminary matter, though, it is worth noting that Waldron may 
characterize my position somewhat more strongly than I meant 
to express it. 
Waldron writes that I contend that an upstream speech 
restriction, Lu, can so severely impair a particular person’s, P’s, 
ability to speak out against a proposed downstream law, Ld, that 
P has “a right that it not be enforced against him.”10 But this 
paraphrase is not quite accurate, for I said nothing about the P 
having a “right” not to have Ld enforcement against him; rather, 
I claimed only that such enforcement was immoral. I do not 
believe it to be the case that people necessarily have even a 
moral right not to have immoral laws enforced against them.11 
Still, given the nature of the deprivation described in my 
Evangelical Photographer Scenario,12 it is a fair inference from 
 
systemic legitimacy. Id. at 705, Professor Eric Heinze shares this view. See ERIC HEINZE, 
HATE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 86 (2016). In addition, Waldron thinks 
that it was my innovation to focus on the effects of speech restrictions on downstream 
legislation only with regard to those constrained by the upstream speech restriction. 
Waldron, supra note 2, at 706. As to his first point, I am not at all sure that Waldron and 
Heinze are right that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech laws on the 
entire legal system rather than their effect on particular downstream laws. Thus Dworkin 
writes: “[But] if we intervene too soon in the process through which collective opinion is 
formed, we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone 
obey these laws.” Ronald Dworkin, Foreword to RONALD DWORKIN, EXTREME SPEECH 
AND DEMOCRACY vii (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (emphasis added). In 
addition, Dworkin states that “on balance Britain is entitled to enforce such laws.” Id. 
(emphasis added). As to his second claim, although I was unaware of it, my view that the 
legitimacy defect in enforcing the downstream law is limited to those constrained by the 
law may have been a modification of Dworkin’s more encompassing view. Waldron 
suggests that I made these modifications of Dworkin’s position “simply to make it come 
out as less implausible than Dworkin’s wholesale version.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 707 
Though I did not consciously modify Dworkin’s position for this or any other reason, I 
would have thought that modifying a position to try to make it “less implausible” is a 
good thing. 
 10. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709. Especially phrasing my argument this way, it is 
puzzling how Waldron could think that I do not take the position that an upstream 
speech restriction cannot “destroy” the legitimacy of downstream legislation. See supra 
note 8. 
 11. For example, it is morally outrageous that most salaried employees in the 
United States making more than $15,000 per year pay some income tax, while some 
billionaires pay none. Nonetheless, I am not prepared to say that these employees have a 
moral right as opposed to a good moral reason not to be assessed income tax. 
 12. In that Scenario, it will be recalled, Lu significantly curtailed the ability of P 
(Elaine) to speak out against Ld, whose application infringed Elaine’s fundamental right 
to religious liberty. This confluence of procedural and substantive moral deprivation 
gives rise to strong moral reason against enforcement. But as I discussed in my Opening 
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what I wrote that Elaine does have a moral right not to have the 
antidiscrimination law enforced against her for refusing to 
photograph a same-sex marriage.13 Where Waldron may 
overstate my position is if he reads me as contending that this 
moral right necessarily implies that there should be a 
corresponding positive law right against enforcement. While I 
think there should be a presumption in any legal system against 
the enforcement of laws that violate moral rights, I do not 
believe that in every such instance people should necessarily 
have a positive law right against such enforcement. This is 
because in my view doctrinal “fit” as well as morality should play 
a role in determining whether a right should be recognized.14 
 
Article, the same-sex couple’s interest in equal treatment in places of public 
accommodation supplies a strong countervailing moral reason supporting enforcement. 
The point of the Scenario is that the speech restriction has changed the moral valence of 
enforcement from positive to negative. Consistent with Waldron’s reformulation of my 
position, one could conceive the EP Scenario as presenting a clash of moral rights, with 
the right against enforcement prevailing. With such strong moral claims on both sides, 
however, I prefer to eschew such rights talk and simply say that, on balance, the 
restriction on Elaine’s ability to oppose the antidiscrimination measure renders immoral 
its enforcement against her for refusing to photograph the wedding. A clearer case for a 
speech restriction giving rise to a moral right against enforcement would occur in the 
absence of such a strong moral reason supporting enforcement. This might be the 
situation, for instance, with enforcement of a law forbidding polygamy against someone 
whose opportunity to speak out against the ban on plural marriage had been severely 
curtailed. 
 13. Of course, this does not mean that Elaine in fact has a positive law right that Ld 
not be enforced against her. The existence of such a right depends on particularities of 
the legal system in which the right is claimed, including the availability of higher-order 
positive law such as a constitutional provision on which an exemption can be based. In 
using the term “rights” in his summary of my position, Waldron is obviously referring to 
moral rights, not positive law rights. As explained in the text, however, his description of 
my position might erroneously attribute to me the view that there should in all cases in 
which Lu has rendered enforcement of Ld immoral be a positive law right against such 
enforcement. 
 14. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 738 n.92. Waldron also describes my position as 
holding that P “has a right to disobey” Ld. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709. But I said 
nothing about a “right” to disobey, only that Lu destroyed any political obligation that P 
may have had to obey that law, that is, to obey the law just because it is the law. See 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 535. Perhaps having been influenced by Waldron’s Response, 
Professor Eric Heinze also reads me as arguing for a “right of disobedience . . . by a 
citizen whose views are excluded” from public discourse by a speech ban. Heinze, supra 
note 3, at 644. Expressly citing Waldron’s Response, Shiffrin also thinks my argument 
“confers a license” on P to disobey the law. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 682. Concededly, 
and analogous to what I said about Elaine having a moral right not to have the 
antidiscrimination law enforced against her, indeed precisely because this enforcement 
would be immoral, I think Elaine does have a moral right not to obey the law’s 
requirement that she photograph the same-sex wedding. But as with the enforcement 
question, this conclusion does not entail the view that she should have a positive law right 
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In addition, and more significantly, Waldron’s imputation of 
a rights generating effect of my position talks past an important 
aspect of the claim. Although I believe that under certain 
circumstances a viewpoint-discriminatory speech restriction can 
indeed render immoral enforcement of a downstream law, much 
more commonly such restrictions will diminish but not utterly 
destroy the legitimacy of the Ld’s enforcement. So to the extent 
that Waldron’s criticism of my position derives from what he 
sees as its improbable “deontic” consequences,15 it fails to 
engage my claim that upstream speech restrictions can impair 
normative legitimacy short of destroying it. For such non-lethal 
damage to legitimacy, while something to “regret,”16 has no 
particular implication for generations of rights, moral or 
positive.17 
With these clarifications of my position, we are now in a 
position to evaluate Waldron’s critique of it. 
There are several crucial flaws in Waldron’s analysis that 
undercut his conclusion that upstream speech restrictions cannot 
render immoral the enforcement of downstream legislation 
 
to an exemption from the law’s operation. (Cf. Heinze, supra note 3, at 644, attributing to 
me the view that those who have been excluded from public discourse by a viewpoint-
based speech restriction should have “immunity” from, and not “face the legal 
consequences” for disobeying, the downstream law.) And it obviously does not mean 
that she in fact has such a right. 
 15. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709. 
 16. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 334 (quoting email from Ronald 
Dworkin to Jeremy Waldron, Oct. 4, 2009, 21:34 EST (on file with Waldron)). 
 17. That Lu can damage short of destroying the legitimacy of enforcing Ld against P 
also shows why I do not, as Shiffrin contends, “give up the ghost” with respect to the 
effects on legitimacy resulting from restrictions on racist speech. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 
681. Shiffrin notes that I specify that “the problem of justifying coercion to a free and 
autonomous person” arises only when P can reasonably disagree with Ld. But, he 
continues, since it would be extremely difficult if not impossible “to formulate a 
persuasive case that arguments based in racial prejudice amount to reasonable 
disagreement[],” my argument about free speech and legitimacy has no bearing with 
regard to restrictions on racist speech. Id. To begin with, I think Shiffrin too facilely 
assumes that while there can be reasonable disagreement about whether it is moral to 
legally force a person to photograph a same-sex wedding in violation of her religious 
convictions, there can be no reasonable disagreement about forcing someone to 
photograph an interracial marriage in violation of her religious dictates. Much would 
depend on whether the racial discrimination in question constitutes “racial prejudice.” 
Cf., a photographer who belongs to a Black Nationalist religion refusing to photograph 
an interracial marriage. But even if Shiffrin is right about this, restrictions on racist 
speech might nevertheless diminish without destroying the legitimacy of enforcing 
antidiscrimination laws against a racist whose ability to express his authentic reasons for 
opposing these laws was curtailed by an upstream speech restriction. 
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against particular individuals. Waldron begins his critique by 
asserting that “debates and decisions in a representative 
legislature are usually seen as legitimizing the enforcement as 
law of the bills that survive this process.”18 For a moment, then, 
it seems as if Waldron is going to assert that the legislative 
process is alone sufficient to legitimize any law resulting from 
this process, even one with which people can reasonably 
disagree. And perhaps Waldron in fact holds this view.19 He 
decides, however, not to rest his entire case on such a 
parsimonious and highly contestable view of the relationship 
between free speech and political legitimacy.20 Rather, Waldron 
allows that the “best case” for my argument “looks at the 
informal public debate that is involved in the election and 
electoral accountability of legislators and in the debates in the 
community that complement legislative debates in the 
parliament.”21 
But even on the assumption that public discourse is “an 
indispensable part of the political process,” the restriction of 
which might perhaps have some impact on downstream 
legislation, it is “quite another thing” in Waldron’s view to assert 
that legal restrictions on this “chaotic and unformed” public 
debate can have the direct consequences for legitimacy that I 
claim.22 For even were a speech restriction to have a “deleterious 
 
 18. Waldron, supra note 2, at 707. 
 19. Thus Waldron writes that he wants to “dispute the whole argument” that 
upstream speech restrictions can have the “deontic effect” on the “rights” of people 
regarding downstream legislation that I suppose. Waldron, supra note 2, at 707. He adds 
that “suppose one were to concede that hate speech laws have a deleterious impact on 
the quality of the political process . . . [t]he most I would concede is that something has 
gone wrong with the character of public debate overall,” but denies that the “moral 
effects” of this speech restriction can generate particular rights. Id. In contrast to his view 
that speech restrictions cannot affect the normative legitimacy of a particular 
downstream law in the way I contend, Waldron is willing to go so far as to not deny that 
speech restrictions can affect systemic legitimacy. Id. at 711. 
 20. Thus as Dean Robert Post aptly observes in his Commentary: “It is not 
sufficient to observe that members of a legislative assembly are free to express their 
opposition to the statute . . . . Freedom of speech underwrites democratic legitimation 
when it allows persons to participate in the formation of public opinion.” Post, supra note 
3, at 654. See also id. (“Elections are only an ‘intermittent mechanism,’ whereas public 
opinion is ‘constantly active’ and, ‘in the long run,’ can exercise ‘a great and growing 
influence,’” (quoting 3 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 159 (New 
York, MacMillan & Co. 1888))). 
 21. Waldron, supra note 2, at 708. 
 22. Id. at 709. 
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impact on the quality of the political process,”23 the difficulty lies 
in “[i]ndividualizing its moral effects to generate particular 
rights” of an individual to disobey the law or to not have it 
enforced against him.24 
To try to show that there is not “any good political 
argument”25 for this position, Waldron considers the effect on 
legitimacy of someone being wrongfully disenfranchised. He 
references laws in the United States restricting early voting and 
imposing onerous voter ID-requirements. Assuming that these 
restrictions unjustifiably prevented people, including a particular 
person “Q,” from voting, this in Waldron’s view may be a 
“deplorable state of affairs.”26 Still, Waldron continues, 
few people believe that any of the laws enacted by the 
legislature (to whose membership Q’s vote might have made 
the sort of difference that individual votes make in elections) 
are rendered illegitimate . . . so far as Q is concerned. No one 
thinks Q now has the right to disobey the laws or not have 
them enforced against him. His disenfranchisement may make 
the democracy poorer, and Q certainly has a justified 
complaint; but nothing follows about legitimacy and 
enforcement so far as his relation to the laws is concerned.27 
Waldron asserts that if nothing follows about the morality 
of enforcement of the laws against Q in the “relatively 
formalized context of voting,” then it cannot “possibly be true” 
that restriction on P’s participation in the “diffuse free-wheeling 
debate” that characterizes public discourse could create any 
legitimacy problem in enforcing a downstream law against P.28 
As I shall discuss in detail in a moment, Waldron’s 
disenfranchisement scenario is in a crucial respect disanalogous 
to the circumstances under which I claim that a speech 
restriction can render immoral the enforcement of a downstream 
law. But first I think it would be useful to bring to the surface 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.. As discussed, supra, text accompanying notes 10 to 14, by problematically 
describing his disagreement with me as centering on whether upstream speech 
restrictions can create “rights” in people not to have downstream laws enforced against 
them or to disobey these laws, Waldron may exaggerate somewhat the extent of this 
disagreement. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 710. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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and then contest a crucial assumption underlying Waldron’s 
argument. 
Waldron assumes that voting is categorically more essential 
to political legitimacy than is participation in public discourse. 
Such a hierarchy is implicit in Waldron’s assertion that if the 
disenfranchisement of Q does not raise legitimacy concerns, then 
a restriction on P’s participation in public discourse could “not 
possibly” do so. Waldron does not purport to make a sustained 
argument in support of this view. Instead, he emphasizes that 
although an individual’s contribution to “the swirling maelstrom 
of informal debate” might have some effect on “things that are 
said and votes that are cast in the legislature,”29 there is no 
guarantee that it will have any effect whatsoever. This is 
because, as Waldron explains: “My letter to the newspaper may 
not be published; there may be no hits on my blog; eyes may be 
turned away from my graffiti; my spoken words may disappear 
into the wind; perhaps no one will turn up for the meetings I 
organize; and the leaflets I distribute may end up in the 
gutter . . . .”30 
It is true that an individual’s contribution to public 
discourse will often have no effect on the legislative process, on 
who is elected to the legislature, or in persuading other 
individuals about matters of public concern. However, it is also 
true that an individual vote will almost never make a difference 
to the outcome of the election.31 Moreover, while most 
contributions to public discourse will when viewed in isolation 
have no effect on society’s collective decisions, and few will have 
more than negligible effect, sometimes an individual 
contribution, such as a blog post that goes viral or a particularly 
persuasive newspaper column, can have a marked effect on the 
outcome of such decisions. In contrast, a single vote can never 
make such a disproportionate contribution to the result of a 
 
 29. Id. at 708. In limiting the importance of public discourse to its ability to 
persuade members of the legislature on how to vote, Waldron’s conception of the 
purpose of freedom of expression is remarkably, and in my view, unjustifiably narrow. 
For one, it ignores the interest of a speaker in confirming “his or her standing as a 
responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.” Dworkin, supra 
note 9, at vii. 
 30. Waldron supra note 2, at 707. 
 31. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Waldron vaguely refers to Q’s vote as 
one that “might have made the sort of difference that individual votes make in 
elections.” Id. at 710. 
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collective decision. So even if the key measure of the 
legitimating function were, as Waldron suggests, the effect on 
collective decision making,32 it is not at all clear that public 
discourse ranks lower than voting. 
But more significantly, even if it were the case that voting 
was categorically more important to legitimation than 
participation in public discourse, Waldron’s disenfranchisement 
scenario cannot do the work he intends for it. The type of voting 
restriction Waldron references is simply not analogous to the 
viewpoint-discriminatory laws that I argue can render the 
enforcement of a downstream law immoral as applied to 
particular individuals.33 While Waldron stipulates that the voting 
restrictions in his scenario are unjustified, he does not posit that 
they were intended to disenfranchise Q or anyone else on 
account of ideology or for holding a viewpoint on a particular 
issue.34 
 
 32. Accord, ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 31–42 (2014). Note that 
Waldron’s minimalistic view of the legitimation of free speech as compared to the 
legislative process would apply not just to particular downstream laws but to systemic 
legitimacy as well. 
 33. Waldron’s scenario is inapt in another way. It examines the effect of 
disenfranchisement on a species of systemic legitimacy, that is, on all the laws passed in a 
particular legislative session. My concern, in contrast, is with the effect of speech 
restrictions on particular downstream laws. Waldron curiously claims that I am “not 
happy with this systemic approach to legitimacy.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. Far 
from being unhappy with such an approach, in a previous article on freedom of 
expression and political legitimacy I emphasized how viewpoint-based speech restrictions 
can undermine systemic legitimacy. See James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political 
Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011). The reservation 
that I expressed in my Opening Article was that the damage to systemic legitimacy 
claimed to be caused by hate speech itself is incommensurable with, or at least very 
difficult to compare to, the detriment to legitimacy of particular laws that I assert can be 
caused by hate speech restrictions. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577. Waldron’s 
scenario suffers from a similar problem. An isolated deprivation of the equal opportunity 
to participate in the political process, be it from a voting or a speech restriction, will have 
a negligible effect on the entire political system or, as in Waldron’s scenario, even on the 
entirety of the laws passed during a legislative session. As such, his scenario tells us little 
about, and in any event is hard to compare to, the effect that a deprivation of the equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process might have on the legitimacy of a 
particular law. Cf. infra note 36 and the scenario in text accompanying it. 
 34. Interestingly, it has been alleged that some actual restrictions on early voting or 
ID-requirements were in fact imposed to disenfranchise people because of their political 
affiliation or even race. David A. Graham, North Carolina’s Deliberate 
Disenfranchisement of Black Voters, THE ATLANTIC (July 29, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/north-carolina-voting-rights-law/493649. Such 
motivation would, of course, raise greater legitimacy concerns than in Waldron’s 
scenario, and perhaps this is why he didn’t mention it. Indeed, disenfranchisement on the 
basis of race can have a ruinous effect on systemic legitimacy. For this reason, I think a 
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A much more analogous scenario would be voting 
restrictions for an upcoming city council election cleverly 
designed to disenfranchise as many people as possible who 
oppose an increase in the property tax. Under such 
circumstances, I would think that Q1, disenfranchised because of 
her opposition to the tax increase, would have a very good claim 
that a law passed by the newly-elected city council raising the tax 
on her property was immoral. And this would be true even if the 
property owner could not show that but for her particular 
disenfranchisement the city council would have not passed the 
tax increase. By the same token, P1, who was able to vote in the 
city council election but who was forbidden by law from 
speaking out against the tax increase in “the maelstrom of 
informal debate” would, like Q1,35 also have a strong moral 
objection to the application of the tax increase to her.36 
 
good case could be made that the longstanding practice of disenfranchising African-
Americans in various jurisdictions in the United States until the latter part of the 
twentieth century rendered the entire legal system in these jurisdictions illegitimate as to 
these disenfranchised citizens, making immoral the application to them of all laws which 
with people could have reasonably disagreed. As a result, such disenfranchisement 
arguably gave those disenfranchised people a moral right to, in Waldron’s terminology, 
“rise up in revolution.” Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 332. Shiffrin 
suggests that the current American legal system is illegitimate, particularly as regards 
African-Americans. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 679-80. He therefore concludes that “[i]f 
revolution is not justified in the United States, it is not that the government is worthy of 
our respect” but because of “pacifist principles” or that such a revolution would “be 
unsuccessful or cause more harm than good.” Id. at 679 n.19. I wholeheartedly agree with 
Shiffrin that there are currently very serious deficits in the legitimacy of the legal system 
in the United States, including the existence of government “lobbyists for the rich at the 
expense of the poor” and “police departments with cultures designed to cover up the 
police murders of people.” Id. at 679–80. Contrary to Shiffrin, however, I do not believe 
that the deficits in the current legal system justify revolution even by those most 
aggrieved. This is in no small part because of the right of every American to express 
virtually any view in public discourse, including vehement condemnation of the police, as 
well as the right of each citizen to cast an equally-weighted vote. See Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 35. The moral of this story is obvious: Waldron should mind better his “Ps and Qs.” 
 36. Concededly, the hypothetical ban on publicly opposing the tax increase 
obviously curtails the ability of speakers to express their views on a particular subject 
more than does even the most restrictive hate speech provision currently in force in any 
democratic country. It therefore would have far more detrimental effect on the 
legitimacy of downstream legislation than do hate speech laws. As explained above, I 
want as much as possible in this Part to put to one side the issue of hate speech bans, as 
Waldron largely does in the part of his response challenging my basic premise that 
speech restrictions have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the enforcement of 
downstream laws against particular individuals. The hypothetical, then, is not offered as 
comparable to hate speech bans but rather only to show that if the speech restriction is 
severe enough, it can indeed have the ruinous effect on downstream legislation that 
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Waldron correctly notes that the crux of my claim that 
speech restrictions can render the enforcement of downstream 
laws immoral is the basic precept that “‘each individual in 
society is of equal moral worth and therefore is entitled to have 
his or her interests treated with equal respect by the 
government.’”37 But it is precisely this equality concern that is 
missing from Waldron’s disenfranchisement scenario. From an 
equality perspective, it is one thing to be disenfranchised by 
unnecessarily burdensome restrictions on early voting or 
unreasonably onerous ID-requirements;38 it is quite another to 
be disenfranchised because of one’s position on a particular 
collective decision. In my view, there comes a point at which a 
speech restriction, like selective disenfranchisement, can so 
profoundly disrespect both the interests and equal moral worth 
of some individuals that the restriction can have an effect not 
just on the legitimacy of the legal system39 but also on particular 
laws enforced against those whose ability to oppose these laws 
was severely curtailed.40 
Waldron apparently41 rejects my equality argument on the 
grounds that even if a speech restriction were to disrespect a 
particular interest of the would-be speaker, there is a host of 
other interests “to be served by our laws” such as “health care, 
 
Waldron denies that it can. Whether under certain circumstances hate speech bans can 
have such an effect is a question that I address in Part II. 
 37. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711 (quoting Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536). 
 38. Such voting restrictions are analogous to unreasonably burdensome content-
neutral time, place and manner restrictions. Although these restrictions can unduly 
impair the right to participate in public discourse, see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 
U.S. 171 (1983) (invalidating law prohibiting demonstrations on sidewalk in front of 
Supreme Court building), they ordinarily do not raise the equality concerns presented by 
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on free speech. 
 39. Waldron seems to accept, or at least does not deny, that such a speech 
restriction could have such an effect. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. 
 40. Waldron correctly notes that I do not take a position on whether an upstream 
speech restriction can affect the application of a downstream law to persons who had no 
desire to speak out against it. Since I wanted in my analysis to focus on the impact that 
viewpoint-based laws might have on the interests of speakers or would-be speakers to 
participate in public discourse, I did not consider the impact that such speech restrictions 
might have on audience interests. For such a discussion, see James Weinstein, Speech 
Categorization and the Limits of Free Speech Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1117-33 (2004). 
 41. I say “apparently” because at this point in his analysis, Waldron is focusing on 
the effect of hate speech bans on the interests of racists restrained by such laws. I think 
though it is a fair inference that Waldron would come to the same conclusion as to any 
speech restriction that could conceivably be enacted in any contemporary liberal 
democracy. 
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education, roads, housing” which the speech restriction does not 
implicate.42 That there are numerous interests not affected by 
the speech restrictions explains why in mature, stable 
democracies even the most restrictive viewpoint-discriminatory 
speech restriction does not come anywhere close to destroying 
the legitimacy of the entire legal system.43 But the existence of 
all these other legally-conferred benefits, while relevant to the 
measure of a legal system’s legitimacy, does little to ameliorate 
the damage to a citizen’s ability to protect those interests 
associated with a particular downstream law arising from an 
upstream speech restriction. 
Believing that concern for the interests of the would-be 
speaker will not yield the detrimental effect I claim that speech 
restrictions can have on downstream laws, Waldron concludes 
that the essence of my equality concern must be about “respect 
for opinions.”44 “The main way in which we express people’s 
opinions in the political process,” Waldron insists, “is by 
counting their votes, and we do count the votes of those whose 
free expression is impacted” by speech restrictions.45 So in the 
end we have come full circle: it is primarily Waldron’s 
disagreement with my view about the legitimating power of free 
speech as compared to voting, not some basic conceptual flaw in 
my argument, that leads him to reject my view about the 
 
 42. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. 
 43. Though it might slightly reduce the “reservoir” of the legal system’s legitimacy. 
See Weinstein, supra note 33, at 368 n.24 (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: 
PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 148–49 (1971)). Despite my explicitly making this 
point in my Opening Article, see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 574 n.165, Heinze seems to 
read me as contending that viewpoint-based speech restrictions on public discourse can 
destroy the legitimacy of the entire legal system as to that citizen. “For Weinstein—
although this is not exactly his phrasing—a democracy that excludes citizens from 
democratic opinion formation effectively dissolves its social contract with them, relieving 
them of their duty to obey law.” Heinze, supra note 3, at 638. See also supra note 9  
(discussing Heinze’s view that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech 
restrictions on systemic legitimacy). For there to be any such catastrophic consequence, 
the democratic deprivation would have to be far greater in scope and impact than any 
speech restriction currently in force or likely to be enacted in any contemporary mature 
and stable democracy. See supra note 34 (arguing that the longstanding practice of 
disenfranchising African-Americans in various jurisdictions in the United States until the 
latter part of the twentieth century may have rendered the entire legal system in these 
jurisdictions illegitimate as to these disenfranchised citizens). 
 44. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. In my Opening Article, I explained that 
“[i]ndividuals . . . are entitled to participate as political equals not just to vindicate their 
personal interests narrowly defined, but also in deciding what in their judgment is best 
for society as a whole.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536. 
 45. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. 
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potentially detrimental effects that speech restrictions might 
have on the legitimacy of downstream legislation. Indeed, I 
suspect herein lies much of the reason for our differing views 
about the propriety of hate speech bans in a free and democratic 
society. 
B. OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE BASIC CLAIM 
1. Rule-of-Law Problems 
Waldron says that he is worried that my view that an 
upstream speech restriction can render immoral the enforcement 
of downstream laws against some people but not others “may get 
tangled up in Rule-of-Law issues about generality.”46 He notes 
that speech restrictions are usually quite general and although 
they may be designed to be enforced against only certain 
speakers, “they have a potential impact on everyone’s speech.”47 
As a result, he fears “it may be hard to identify the basis for in 
personam illegitimacy of the type” that I suggest.48 
I agree that my argument raises rule-of-law issues and not 
just the one that Waldron notes. In addition to the identification 
problem he worries about, there is the equal justice concern of a 
particular class of people possibly being exempted from 
obligations imposed on everyone else in society. But if I am right 
that upstream speech restrictions can render the application of 
downstream laws immoral, then criticizing my argument for any 
rule-of-law problems resulting from this unfortunate 
consequence is a classic case of “shooting the messenger.” Surely 
the blame for any such problems lies with the speech restrictions. 
In any event, these rule-of-law problems are essentially no 
different than the ones that commonly arise when general laws 
provide exemptions for a certain class people, e.g., those with 
religious objections to the law, or when courts find that 
exemptions are required by constitutional provisions, such as 
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion. In both instances, 
there is the problem of identifying who is eligible for the 
exemption and justifying the impact on the equal administration 
of the laws arising from the exemption. 
 
 46. Waldron, supra note 2, at 706. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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In fact, any-rule-of law issues raised by my argument are 
less problematic than the exemptions from general law just 
discussed. Aside from providing a reason against the enactment 
of viewpoint-discriminatory laws, the only other practical 
consequence of my analysis is to detect instances in which the 
enforcement of a downstream law may have been rendered 
immoral by an upstream speech restriction. As I have explained, 
however, this does not necessarily mean that the law should not 
be enforced.49 And where the law will be enforced despite the 
moral deficit, there is, unlike with granting an exemption, no 
need to identify with precision those against whom enforcement 
of the law would be immoral.50 
2. The Relationship between the Justification of a Speech 
Restriction and its Effect on Political Legitimacy 
I concluded my Opening Article by arguing that the 
untoward effects that hate speech restrictions have on the 
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws “weigh[] against such 
upstream constraints.”51 In his Commentary, Professor Steven 
Shiffrin succinctly offers a powerful conceptual challenge not 
just to this specific conclusion regarding hate speech laws but 
also to the significance of my entire position as it relates to 
 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 50. Heinze argues that any attempt to limit my argument to downstream laws 
“‘directly’ related to the proscribed speech, such as laws imposing upon employers 
various non-discrimination norms contrary to the viewpoints of excluded hate speakers” 
is “too arbitrary.” Heinze, supra note 3, at 644. In his view, once a citizen is excluded 
“pro tanto from public discourse, there is no area of law to which that exclusion becomes 
irrelevant in principle.” He gives an example of an anti-Semite who believes that “Jews 
run the world” and who thus can connect that belief to “any legal norm or practice,” 
including the speech limit or the tax on cigarettes. I am not sure I see the problem. If an 
anti-Semite were prohibited from giving as his reason for opposing certain laws his 
authentically held belief they were masterminded by a Jewish conspiracy for the benefit 
of Jews, then such a speech restriction would most likely damage the descriptive 
legitimacy of those laws as applied to this bigot and in certain situations impair, and 
perhaps even on a very rare occasion destroy, normative legitimacy as well. This 
potential damage would usually be less if a bigot did not want to speak out against a 
particular law or laws but was nonetheless prohibited from expressing the view that all 
laws and policies in his jurisdiction are unduly influenced by a group of people. And of 
course, many of those wanting to engage in hate speech, or expression that many believe 
to be hate speech such as proclaiming that homosexual conduct is immoral, do not have 
such “a comprehensively conspiratorial world view.” Id. 
 51. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 582. I added that if there were non-coercive 
measures that had not yet been tried to combat the alienating effect of hate speech that 
Waldron described, then this argument “weighs heavily” against the propriety of hate 
speech laws in a free and democratic society. Id at 583. 
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normative legitimacy. “If hate speech restrictions are 
justifiable,” Shiffrin writes, “then their enforcement cannot 
undermine the normative legitimacy of anti-discrimination 
laws.”52 If, on the other hand, “such restrictions are not 
justifiable,” Shiffrin contends, “then the impact on anti-
discrimination laws is interesting, but not central to the case 
against them.”53 For this reason, Shiffrin characterizes my 
argument as “an instance of the tail wagging the dog.”54 Waldron 
makes a similar argument, observing that since “it is only 
unjustified restrictions on speech that affect [normative] 
legitimacy, then it looks as though we will have to settle the 
question of justification first, before we assess the impact on 
legitimacy.”55 He adds that for this reason “the argument about 
legitimacy can hardly be cited as a reason for thinking” that an 
upstream law is inappropriate.56 
There are two problems with this interesting conceptual 
challenge. First, it mistakenly assumes that whether a law is 
justified is an all-or-nothing proposition, when as Waldron 
helpfully emphasized regarding the effect of speech restrictions 
on legitimacy, “the legitimacy of any given law is itself a matter 
of degree.”57 Relatedly, the argument ignores the iterative 
nature of the process for determining whether a law is justified. 
To say that a law or a proposed law is justified means that 
there are better reasons for the law (its benefits) than there are 
reasons against it (its costs).58 So while in the final analysis a law 
is either justified or it is not, it is also the case that some laws are 
better justified than others. With respect to speech restrictions 
that are extremely well justified, Shiffrin and Waldron are surely 
correct that such constraints can have no detrimental effect on 
normative legitimacy. To borrow a venerable example from 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a law punishing falsely crying 
“fire!” with the intent of causing a panic59 would have no impact 
 
 52. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 675. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Waldron, supra note 2, at 712. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 333. 
 58. I am referring here to moral as opposed to legal justification. Even an immoral 
law might as a matter of positive law be legally justified in the sense, for instance, that it 
comports with constitutional constraints. See infra note 62. 
 59. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:59 AM 
732 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:715 
 
on normative legitimacy. In contrast, speech restrictions that on 
balance may be justified because they are necessary to prevent 
serious harm but nonetheless trench upon core free speech 
interests undoubtedly can have serious detrimental effects on 
descriptive legitimacy. And it could be argued that such laws 
impair normative legitimacy to some extent as well.60 
Consider, for instance, the Smith Act,61 a law passed early in 
the Cold War banning advocacy of the overthrow of the United 
States government by force of violence. While I do not believe 
this law was justified, many thoughtful people, including a 
majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court,62 
believed that it was. But even if this law was justified, the cost to 
freedom of expression cannot be seriously doubted. As Justice 
Felix Frankfurter candidly acknowledged in voting to uphold the 
convictions of the leaders of the American Communist Party for 
conspiring to engage in advocacy forbidden under the Smith Act: 
[C]oupled with such advocacy is criticism of defects in our 
society. . . . [Moreover, suppressing] advocates of overthrow 
inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate 
overthrow but fear that their criticism may be so 
construed. . . . [It] is self-delusion to think that we can punish 
[the defendants] for their advocacy without adding to the risks 
 
 60. Consistent with this view, in my Opening Article I concluded that despite their 
viewpoint-discriminatory effect, hate speech laws limited to prohibiting use of highly 
vituperative language such as referring to members of minority groups as “rats” or 
cockroaches” or other animals “‘we would normally seek to exterminate’” to “stir up 
racial hatred” might in some circumstance be “adequately justified.” Weinstein, supra 
note 1, at 547–48. Contrary to Waldron, however, I contended such laws nonetheless had 
some non-trivial effect on normative legitimacy, though not enough to “substantially 
diminish” anyone’s political obligation to obey a downstream antidiscrimination law and 
“not nearly substantial enough to nullify the large moral benefit” of preventing landlords 
from refusing housing to people based or their race or ethnicity. Id. at 548. Importantly, 
this assessment was made on the assumption that these laws would in actual operation 
precisely target just such highly vituperative speech. Accordingly, I assumed for the sake 
of argument that these laws would not substantially impair the ability of individuals 
without excessive vituperation to express opposition to antidiscrimination measures or to 
criticize the people these measures are meant to protect. Consistent with what I say 
below, if experience showed that these laws were in actual operation applied in a way 
that substantially interfered with such expression to the detriment of political legitimacy 
of these downstream laws, then the justification of the upstream speech restriction would 
need to be reevaluated. 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 2385. 
 62. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Of course, the Court’s decision to 
uphold the law and affirm these convictions means only that a majority of the Justices 
thought the law was constitutionally justified. But there can be little doubt that several of 
the Justices also thought that the law was morally justified. 
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run by loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the 
reforms these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in 
sustaining the convictions before us we can hardly escape 
restrictions on the interchange of ideas.63 
So even if the Smith Act was justified, by chilling honest 
criticism of “defects in [American] society,” the law nonetheless 
had a detrimental effect on the legitimizing function of freedom 
of expression, certainly in the descriptive sense, and arguably in 
the normative sense as well.64 Similarly, even if the restriction on 
core political speech imposed a century and a half earlier by the 
Alien and Sedition Act was justified, as Waldron has suggested,65 
the law damaged descriptive legitimacy66 and arguably negatively 
affected normative legitimacy. So it is not at all certain, as 
Waldron and Shiffrin assert, that only unjustified laws can have a 
detrimental effect on normative legitimacy.67 Rather, the better 
view may be that if speech restriction justification is a close call, 
the law can impair normative as well as descriptive legitimacy. 
There is, however, a contrary view with considerable force. 
If under the best assessments that can be made at any particular 
time a law is justified, then, so are any costs, including the 
“chilling effect,” it may impose.68 On this view, if the Smith Act 
and Alien and Sedition Act were justified, then even the 
considerable cost to descriptive legitimacy, though regrettable, 
 
 63. Id. at 549 (Frankfurter, J, concurring). 
 64. The damage here was to systemic legitimacy both “in rem” and even more 
acutely “in personam” as to those “loyal citizens” whose speech was deterred by the 
Smith Act. 
 65. Jeremy Waldron, Free Speech & the Menace of Hysteria, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
May 29, 2008, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/05/29/free-speech-the-menace-of-
hysteria/ (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: 
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2008)). 
 66. See Post, supra note 3, at 652. 
 67. Interestingly, Waldron seems to concede that Britain’s hate speech laws, which 
he obviously thinks are very well justified, could have a “minimal effect on legitimacy.” 
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335. So wouldn’t it follow that a just-
barely justified law could have a greater impact on legitimacy? (In fairness to Waldron, 
he also has characterized the loss of legitimacy caused by Britain’s hate speech laws as 
“minimal or nonexistent.” WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 183 (emphasis 
added)). In any event, Waldron previously seems to have thought the question of the 
relationship between justification of a speech restriction and its effect on the legitimacy 
of downstream laws was not quite as clear cut as he now claims it to be. 
 68. By way of analogy, if a bombing campaign as part of a just war is morally 
justified, then so is all collateral damage that could not have been avoided with the 
exercise of due care. On this view, while the collateral damage is regrettable, it is not 
immoral. 
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was not wrongful and thus did not damage normative legitimacy. 
But even on this view, a law’s justification is not a static, one-
shot determination but is rather a dynamic and continuous 
process. So even if Waldron is right that we will “have to settle 
the question of justification first, before we assess the impact on 
legitimacy,” he fails to take into account that any determination 
about whether a law is justified, especially one made before a 
law goes into effect, must be open to revision in light of 
information about its actual operation. With respect to speech 
restrictions, such reevaluation would include how effective the 
law has been in preventing the harm thought to be caused by the 
restricted speech as well as whether the law has been misapplied, 
thereby having a greater “chilling effect” on non-targeted speech 
than anticipated. 
In my Opening Article, I cited a number of cases in which 
hate speech laws were applied, or misapplied, to speech that 
must be allowed in any free and democratic society and thus 
wrongfully punished people for participating in public discourse. 
In addition, as a result of such misapplication, would-be speakers 
were likely wrongfully deterred from engaging in this public 
debate in ways likely not accurately predicted in the initial 
assessments of whether these laws were justified.69 In light of this 
new information, the justification of at least those hate speech 
laws that have been applied in this way, and perhaps all those of 
its genus, should be reevaluated in light of the detrimental effect 
on legitimacy.70 
There is another reason for reevaluation of the justification 
of hate speech laws and hence their potential impact on 
normative legitimacy. Even according to its harshest critic, the 
claim that upstream speech restrictions can deprive downstream 
laws of political legitimacy is a novel one.71 Accordingly, if this 
claim has any validity, then the justification of hate speech laws 
 
 69. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58. 
 70. So if in the bombing campaign scenario posited in note 68 supra it was 
determined after several air raids both that the civilian casualties were far greater than 
anticipated and that the strategic value of the target was less than originally thought, 
continued raids might well be immoral at least in the absence of increased precautions 
against collateral damage. 
 71. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. More generally, as Waldron notes, 
legitimacy is neglected in political theory. Waldron, supra note 2, at 698. 
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should be reassessed to evaluate the possibility of untoward 
effects of these laws that had not been previously considered.72 
Professor Eric Heinze’s Commentary also raises the 
relationship between justification and legitimacy, though in a 
very different way than Shiffrin’s and Waldron’s critiques. The 
burden of Heinze’s learned Commentary is to show that 
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on public discourse such as 
hate speech bans are illegitimate.73 Problematically, he 
repeatedly attributes this view to me,74 and at one point even 
refers to it as my “thesis.”75 My thesis, however, focuses not on 
the legitimacy of upstream laws that impose constraints on 
public discourse, as does Heinze’s Commentary, but rather on 
the effect that these constraints might have on the legitimacy of 
downstream legislation. In my Opening Article I contended that 
the potentially baleful effect that hate speech restrictions could 
have on downstream legislation “weighs against” the propriety, 
i.e., the justification, of such laws in a free and democratic 
society.76 I said nothing about the legitimacy of such speech 
restrictions themselves. And surely just because a law, on 
balance, is not adequately justified does not mean that it is also 
illegitimate, at least not in the sense that I have used the term. 
Concededly, because of the negative impact that such speech 
restrictions have on democracy it may well be that inadequately 
justified viewpoint-discriminatory laws are illlegitimate under 
some accepted definition of that term. This is an interesting 
 
 72. By the same token, those of us who are skeptical that hate speech laws are 
justifiable in mature, stable democracies should be open to revising views in light of new 
empirical evidence as well as new arguments, or better argued versions of old ones. 
While I remain skeptical about the operation in actual practice of even hate speech laws 
limited to highly vituperative racist expression, Waldron’s arguments have persuaded me 
that as a theoretical matter such bans might be justified. And as I make clear in Part II of 
this Reply, if there were persuasive evidence that hate speech in public discourse was 
actually deterring a significant number of members of some vulnerable minority group 
from participating in public discourse, I would be open to the propriety of even broader 
hate speech laws after all reasonably available alternatives to speech suppressive 
measures had been tried and found wanting. 
 73. Heinze thus begins his Commentary by stating that “[d]emocracy is the ongoing 
product of public discussion” and then asking “[w]ith what legitimacy, then, can a 
democracy limit its citizens’ participation in that discussion?” Heinze, supra note 3, at 
631. See also id. at 633, 636, 639, 643, 645, and 649. 
 74. Id. at 632, 638, 644. 
 75. Id. at 644. 
 76. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 582. 
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question worthy of exploration. But with so many other issues to 
consider in this Symposium, it is not one I chose to investigate. 
C. CHALLENGES TO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE CLAIM 
On an understanding of normative legitimacy as “a 
fundamentally non-consequentialist and non-instrumental idea” 
as well as one focusing “primarily on procedure in the broadest 
sense of that word,” Professor Frederick Schauer agrees that my 
view about free speech and normative legitimacy seems “largely 
correct.”77 Specifically, on such an understanding he agrees that 
“allowing people to object to policies with which they disagree is 
a necessary component of normative legitimacy, and thus of the 
warrant of the state to enforce its directive by coercive means.”78 
His one caveat is that it is “plausible” to argue that so long as 
citizens have the right to choose who will represent them, the 
“right of the citizen to speak out” is not a necessary condition of 
democratic legitimacy.79 Schauer mentions this possible 
objection in order to emphasize that “a strong and continuous 
right to freedom of speech is not entailed by the very idea of 
democracy, at least as long as the idea of representative 
democracy is not an oxymoron.”80 Despite this observation, 
however, Schauer acknowledges that it is “difficult to imagine a 
process of selecting representatives or policies that is not 
crucially facilitated by direct citizen speech” and that it is even 
“more difficult” to envision a government that “does not permit 
those people to participate in policy-making outside of the 
episodic process of voting.”81 He thus concludes that “freedom 
of speech is arguably simply part of the definition of what 
democracy and democratic legitimacy just are.”82 
Given the role that public opinion plays in determining the 
results of collective decisions in every democratic society that 
exists in the world today, I have no sympathy for the view that 
the right of the people to elect their representatives is alone 
sufficient to legitimize the use of coercion to enforce these 
 
 77. Schauer, supra note 3, at 663. 
 78. Id. at 662–63. 
 79. Id. at 663. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 664. Schauer is not sure how “translating this basic proposition of 
normative political philosophy into the language of ‘legitimacy’ adds very much” but 
acknowledges that this objection is basically a “terminological quibble.” Id. 
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decisions. It was therefore useful for someone with a bit more 
sympathy for this position to present it—and then largely refute 
it. This is especially true since my principal interlocutor seems to 
have a lot of sympathy for this position.83 
With respect to free speech and descriptive (or sociological) 
legitimacy, Schauer thinks it “entirely reasonable” for me to 
conclude based upon extrapolation from empirical studies that 
people claim to be more willing to comply with laws with which 
they disagree if they have had an opportunity to publicly express 
their disagreement with these measures.84 Still, Schauer notes 
that the empirical research on which I rely “stops short of 
answering the ultimate question—will people who claim to 
believe in the obligation to obey laws with which they disagree, 
and who in fact believe that they have an obligation to obey such 
laws, actually obey such laws”?85 Schauer correctly observes that 
just because people believe a course of action is proper does not 
mean that they will in in fact follow that belief. He thinks that 
this is especially true where there are “temptation[s]” to deviate 
from that belief. Since disagreement with a law is such a 
“temptation,” Schauer concludes that the “abstract belief” in 
obeying such laws may well be overwhelmed in “actual 
practice.”86 Because we lack empirical evidence that the belief 
that a law ought to be obeyed translates into compliance with 
the law, in Schauer’s view all we really can say about the effect 
of free speech on this crucial question regarding descriptive 
legitimacy is that “we do not know.”87 
I agree with Schauer that I did not attend carefully enough 
to the distinction between belief in complying with a 
disagreeable law and actually doing so. I did not mean to claim, 
as a statement in my Opening Article can reasonably be read as 
suggesting,88 that there was a perfect or even a strong 
 
 83. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 84. Id. at 671. 
 85. Id. at 672. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 673. 
 88. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 537 n.42 (“studies find that people’s increased 
belief in their having an obligation to obey the law results in their voluntary compliance 
with the law.”). Even my slightly more nuanced statement that “the weakening of this 
sense of obligation would likely lead to less compliance with the law,” id. at 547 n.82, 
overstates for the reason Schauer gives what can fairly be inferred from the empirical 
evidence. 
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correspondence between such belief and practice. Contrary to 
Schauer, however, I think we can with some confidence conclude 
that to some as yet unascertained extent there is, though 
certainly not in every case, a causal connection between such 
belief and actual compliance. To use Schauer’s example, a 
person’s belief that he should lose weight is certainly no 
guarantee that he will do so given temptations such as the ready 
availability of tasty, highly caloric food.89 But all things held 
equal, including those temptations, it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that the people who have a belief that they should lose 
weight are more likely to do so than those who have no such 
belief. 
As I noted in my Opening Article, Schauer has in recent 
work helpfully clarified what it means to “obey the law”90 and 
has usefully criticized empirical studies for their confusion on 
this issue.91 I am pleased that Schauer has used his Commentary 
in this Symposium to further advance his important project. 
Like Schauer’s commentary, Dean Robert Post’s 
contribution focuses on descriptive legitimacy.92 But unlike 
Schauer, he chooses to concentrate on the damage speech 
restrictions, including hate speech bans, can have on systemic 
legitimacy as opposed to the legitimacy of particular laws. In 
Part II, I will discuss Post’s incisive discussion of the impact of 
speech restrictions on systemic legitimacy. But here I want to 
engage the few brief comments he does make about the 
 
 89. Schauer, supra note 3, at 672. 
 90. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 534 n.25. 
 91. Id. at 537 n.43. 
 92. Post, supra note 3. Indeed, because he considers the question of normative 
legitimacy to be properly within the realm of moral philosophers, not legal scholars, Post 
eschews this inquiry altogether. To the extent that Post means to imply that it is not 
properly within the scope of a legal scholar’s bailiwick to consider how normative 
legitimacy might be affected by speech restrictions, I respectfully disagree. Free speech 
issues are suffused with normativity. Though always of some relevance, the deep moral 
underpinnings of free speech sometimes properly remain submerged, such as with highly 
technical inquiries about doctrinal fit. At other times, however, consideration of the 
normative core becomes crucial, such as in attempting to explain, as I try to do in this 
Symposium, why democratic self-governance is a vital free speech value. As a 
preeminent legal scholar has written: “The normative essence of democracy is thus 
located in the communicative processes necessary to instill a sense of self-
determination.” Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 282 (1991). Following Post’s lead, I endeavor in this 
Symposium to elucidate this essence. 
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potential of speech restrictions to undercut the legitimacy of 
particular downstream laws. 
Post agrees that it “is conceivable that regulations of speech 
might undermine the descriptive legitimacy of specific laws.”93 
With respect to hate speech bans, for instance, he believes that if 
such restrictions are “capaciously interpreted” in the 
“distressingly broad ways” that my Opening Article shows they 
can be, then downstream antidiscrimination measures “may well 
suffer from diminished legitimacy” by making those prevented 
from expressing opposition to the law likely to regard the laws as 
“unfairly enacted.”94 Nonetheless, Post considers the detrimental 
effect on legitimacy might have on individual laws as “a 
complicated and largely idiosyncratic question.”95 He contends 
that “[i]ndividual laws become descriptively illegitimate 
primarily because they are mismatched to the mores of the 
population to which they are applied.”96 As examples, Post 
recalls that the Constitutional Amendment establishing 
Prohibition in the United States was widely regarded as 
illegitimate in the Northeast, while the Amendment prohibiting 
racial discrimination in voting was long treated as illegitimate in 
the South.97 
The idiosyncratic nature of descriptive legitimacy of 
individual laws that Post notes, however, has to do with 
profound disagreement about the substance of laws. The damage 
to legitimacy that can result from speech restrictions, in contrast, 
is a procedural concern arising from the curtailment of the ability 
of dissenters to express opposition to the law. Though the 
opposition to the substance of various laws might be 
idiosyncratic, there is nothing idiosyncratic about the feeling that 
a law has been “unfairly enacted” because one’s ability to 
oppose it was selectively curtailed. These feelings are no more 
idiosyncratic than those of “persons of widely varying views” 
coming to “distrust a political system that holds out the promise 
of self-determination but that refuses to hear what [they] have to 
say.”98 
 
 93. Post, supra note 3, at 652. 
 94. Id. at 653–54. 
 95. Id. at 651. 
 96. Id. at 652. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 656–57. 
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I accept, as Post implies, that it might be “complicated” to 
disentangle the damage to descriptive legitimacy caused by the 
speech restriction from that resulting from vehement opposition 
to the substance of the law. But as Post correctly recognizes, 
unlike detriments to normative legitimacy, damage to descriptive 
legitimacy does not support arguments that there is no 
obligation to obey the law.99 Accordingly, the procedural and 
substantive elements need not be neatly sorted out to appreciate 
that curtailing the ability of citizens to express opposition to a 
law can greatly exacerbate damage to descriptive legitimacy 
arising from profound disagreement with the law’s substance. 
II. HATE SPEECH BANS AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
In this Part, I will respond to criticisms that I have 
exaggerated the extent to which hate speech bans have impaired 
citizens’ ability to participate as equals in public discourse, while 
at the same time failed to appreciate the effect that hate speech 
itself has on political legitimacy. But before doing so it might be 
useful to clear up some possible misconceptions about the goals 
of my Opening Article as well as about my position on hate 
speech regulation more generally. 
A. THE GOALS OF THE OPENING ARTICLE 
First, I want to emphasize that the primary purpose of my 
Opening Article was to expand and explore in detail the 
argument, stated only cursorily in previous works, that upstream 
speech restriction could damage, and potentially even destroy, 
the legitimacy of downstream legislation.100 For the reasons 
explained above,101 I chose to use hate speech bans as the 
exemplar of speech restrictions that could have this baneful 
effect.102 Though the discussion has to some significant extent 
shifted in that direction, it was not my intent in my Opening 
Article to engage in a comprehensive discussion of the 
 
 99. Id. at 653–54. 
 100. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 541 (“It is the thesis of this article that the 
infringement of this fundamental interest of equal political participation can have severe 
consequences not just for the legitimacy of the legal system but also for individual 
downstream laws.”). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 4 to 5. 
 102. I noted that other types of speech restrictions, such as blasphemy laws and bans 
on glorifying terrorism or aiding terrorist organizations, also have the potential to 
undercut the legitimacy of downstream laws. Id. at 541 n.60. 
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arguments for or against hate speech regulation103 or to argue 
that hate speech regulation is “wrong in principle.”104 
Professor Katharine Gelber complains that my Opening 
Article “lacks a clear conception of hate speech.”105 But precisely 
because this article was not meant to be a comprehensive 
discussion of the pros and cons of hate speech legislation, I did 
not think it necessary to undertake the difficult task of defining 
hate speech.106 In any event, the lack of “a clear conception of 
hate speech” in the Opening Article seems not to have been 
problematic. Crucially, no participant in this Symposium 
gainsaid that the speech in my key Evangelical Photographer 
 
 103. For such a discussion, see JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY 
AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE (1999). As noted above, the 
only overall implication for the hate speech debate that I drew from my analysis is that 
the potential damage to the legitimacy of downstream legislation “weighs against” the 
propriety of hate speech laws in mature and stable democracies, and “heavily” against 
such laws before non-coercive remedies have been exhausted. See supra note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
 104. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 704. Far from finding hate speech laws wrong in 
principle, I wrote in my Opening Article that a legislature could under some 
circumstances reasonably conclude that narrow bans on highly vituperative hate speech 
of the type that Waldron supports are justified. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548. My 
doubts about such restrictions are not so much theoretical as they are pragmatic. So 
Shiffrin is correct in observing that I “might be counted out as a general opponent of hate 
speech restrictions.” Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 681. Cf. Heinze, supra note 3, at 635 
(arguing that all viewpoint-based restrictions on speech, including hate speech bans, are 
contrary to basic democratic principles). Regarding my position on hate speech laws, 
Brown writes the impression he gets from my Opening Article is that I “partly” see 
defenders of hate speech bans as “defend[ing] the indefensible.” I am not sure what to 
make of the oxymoronic qualification “partly.” (Cf. “I partly think that people who 
commit hate crimes are deplorable.”) But while I find the breadth of the bans on hate 
speech that Brown endorses difficult to square with core democratic principles (see infra 
note 186), I don’t find even these restrictions “indefensible” in light of the serious harm 
that hate speech is capable of causing even in mature, stable democracies. What I do find 
indefensible are certain rationales that have been offered in support of hate speech bans, 
including Brown’s use of the precautionary principle to support the “silencing 
argument.” See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 757. (I reply in detail below to Brown’s 
further attempt to defend his use of the precautionary principle.) For another 
indefensible rationale for suppressing hate speech, see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 
758, in which writing for a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court Justice Robert 
George Brian Dickson stated: “Hate propaganda seriously threatens . . . the enthusiasm 
with which the value of equality is accepted and acted upon by society.” 
 105. Gelber, supra note 3, at 619. 
 106. Apropos the difficulty of this task, Gelber aptly adds “to be fair” that “the lack 
of a clear definition of hate speech is in fact part of the problem” that I have with hate 
speech laws in actual operation. Id. 
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Scenario might have been prosecuted in some democratic 
jurisdictions as hate speech.107 
Similarly, I hope I might be acquitted for not explaining 
“the defining features of hate speech, properly understood,”108 by 
which Professor Gelber evidently means expression that can and 
should be properly banned in a mature and stable democratic 
society. While I am open to the possibility that hate speech 
restrictions in such societies might under certain circumstances 
be appropriate,109 I remain skeptical of their propriety. So asking 
me to explain the defining features of hate speech that can be 
properly suppressed is not unlike asking an agnostic to explain 
the essential characteristics of God. 
Having dealt with a possible important misconception of the 
intent of my Opening Article, I turn now to Waldron’s 
questioning my motive for focusing on the detrimental effects 
that hate speech bans can have on political legitimacy. In his 
Response, Waldron writes: 
Back of all the points I am going to make in this essay 
responding to Weinstein is a worry that the argument about 
political legitimacy is just being wheeled into the hate speech 
 
 107. As discussed below, several participants validly took issue with my using 
prosecution of anti-homosexual speech under Section 5 of the UK’s Public Order Act, 
which as I made clear is not a hate speech law, to impugn the operation of hate speech 
laws. This problem, however, did not derive from lack of a “clear conception” of hate 
speech. Similarly, the disagreement between Waldron and me, also discussed below, 
about whether the section of the Public Order Act enhancing the penalty for racially or 
religiously motivated violations of Section 5 is a hate crime rather than a hate speech 
statute, does not stem from uncertainty as to what type of expression constitutes hate 
speech. 
 108. Gelber is mistaken in asserting that I imply “quite strongly” that “two of the 
defining features of hate speech, properly understood, are vituperation and the use of 
epithets.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 620. Because Waldron focused on these features in his 
work, I did so as well, not because I thought that these were “defining features of hate 
speech, properly understood” but to engage Waldron on his own terms. It is true that I 
concluded that if highly vituperative hate speech could be narrowly targeted with no 
substantial chilling effect on those who wanted to express bigoted ideas without 
vituperation, such a restriction would have a minimal impact on normative legitimacy. 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545. But as important as the impact on normative legitimacy 
is to the calculus on the propriety of banning hate speech, it is still only one of many 
factors, including consideration of the impact on descriptive legitimacy which I concluded 
could be substantially impaired by even the narrow bans that Waldron supports. 
 109. For what it’s worth, I agree with my fellow skeptic Robert Post that whether 
such restrictions are appropriate depends on “variables like the number of persons in 
target groups, the intensity of their sense of exclusion” and whether or not “the ambient 
legal and social environment makes members of target groups feel safe and included.”
Post, supra note 3, at 657–58. 
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debate opportunistically by people who have never otherwise 
shown that they take it seriously. I want to make sure that the 
argument is not just being rigged up for the purposes of the 
hate speech debate.110 
Waldron needn’t have worried. The relationship between 
free speech and legitimacy has long been a particular interest of 
mine, a connection that I have explored in works far afield from 
the “the hate speech debate.”111 For instance, in an article in 
another Symposium in this journal, I defended at length political 
legitimacy as the normative essence of American free speech 
doctrine.112 And far from being “rigged up” to specifically 
protect hate speech,113 I emphasized in these previous works that 
 
 110. Waldron, supra note 2, at 699–700. See also id. at 706 (suggesting that my 
“theory of political legitimacy” is “specifically invented for” the hate speech debate and 
“rigged” to yield a certain result.) 
 111. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Database Protection and the First Amendment, 28 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 305, 317, 327 (2003); Weinstein, supra note 40 at 1104, 1113-15; James 
Weinstein, Fools, Knaves and the Protection of Commercial Speech: A Response to 
Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV 133, 145 (2007); James Weinstein, Institutional 
Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 512–13 (2007); James Weinstein, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498, 509-14 (2011). 
 112. See Weinstein, supra note 33. But not only is Waldron’s motivational concern 
misplaced, it is also odd. Why on earth would any right thinking person want to “rig[] up” 
an argument to protect something as noxious as racist, homophobic, or anti-Semitic 
expression? To the contrary, the natural temptation would be to “rig” the argument 
against the protection of such loathsome expression as evinced, for example, by 
Alexander Brown’s invocation of the precautionary principle. See Part II. C. 2, infra. I 
would hope that Waldron and other defenders of hate speech legislation would 
understand that the motivation for my skepticism of hate speech bans is the concern that 
these restrictions and the justifications offered to support them will undermine the 
strength of a free speech principle required to adequately protect dissent in a free and 
democratic society, including by members of minority groups. See Part II. C. 2, infra. In 
this regard, it is worth noting that Mari Matsuda, a prominent supporter of hate speech 
bans, decades ago expressed admiration for “the conviction and conviction [of] Jewish 
civil libertarians who have eloquently, and at great personal cost, argued for the free 
speech rights of Nazis and Klan members.” Although she passionately disagreed with this 
position, she recognized that it did not derive from insensitivity to the harms of hate 
speech but rather from the belief that “the right of protest [is] essential for the protection 
of minorities.” Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2326 (1989). 
 113. Also giving rise to this worry about “rigging” is Waldron’s erroneous view that 
in declining to balance the loss of legitimacy to a particular law against gains to systemic 
legitimacy as argued for by Alexander Brown due to incommensurability problems, I was 
somehow “dismiss[ing] or ignor[ing]” Brown’s concern and therefore not following “the 
legitimacy principle where it leads.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 699–700. Far from 
dismissing or ignoring Brown’s concern, I dealt with it at considerable length. See 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576–78. In addition, to obviate the incommensurability 
problem I then built on Brown’s argument to identify a commensurable countervailing 
legitimacy concern. Id. at 580–81. Indeed, I concluded this countervailing legitimacy 
concern arising from hate speech itself might, like the one I have identified arising from a 
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the potential for a speech restriction to damage the legitimacy of 
downstream legislation applies to any viewpoint-based 
restriction on public discourse—be it a restriction on anti-war 
speech, opposition to a tax increase, or criticism of a nation’s 
immigration policy.114 
Finally, I want to dispel any notion that I believe hate 
speech is incapable of causing harm beyond profound offense.115 
To the contrary, as I have often explained, I believe that even in 
a mature, stable democracy hate speech has the potential to 
produce any number of much more serious harms including 
discrimination and even violence against those denounced by the 
bigoted expression.116 In addition, as I explained in my Opening 
Article, I agree with Waldron that hate speech can make 
 
hate speech ban, also destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law as applied to members 
of this minority group. Id. at 581. Later in this Reply, I will further engage Brown’s 
countervailing legitimacy concerns. See infra text accompanying notes 169 to 203. In 
addition, now that the discussion has been expanded to also focus on hate speech and 
systemic legitimacy, I will try to evaluate the claims that commentators have made about 
the effect of both hate speech bans and hate speech itself on the legitimacy of the legal 
system. See notes 236 to 245, infra. For unlike the determent of hate speech bans on 
particular laws versus the damage of hate speech itself to systemic legitimacy, this 
expanded discussion presents commensurable claims. In short, whatever problems there 
may be with my view about free speech and legitimacy, I don’t think that failing to follow 
“the legitimacy principle where it leads” is one of them. 
 114. James Weinstein, Extreme Speech, Public Order, and Democracy: Lessons from 
the Masses, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 23, 28 (Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein eds., 2009). 
 115. Shiffrin writes that “a restriction on hate speech is not imposed merely because 
government finds the speech disagreeable, disturbing, or offensive as Weinstein 
suggests.” Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 677 n.68. This statement is misleading. What I actually 
wrote, quoting from an earlier article not focusing on hate speech, is that “if an individual 
is excluded from participating in public discourse because the government disagrees with 
the speaker’s views or because it finds the ideas expressed too disturbing or offensive, 
any decision taken as a result of that discussion would, as to such an excluded citizen, 
lack legitimacy.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529–30 (quoting Weinstein, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 111, at 498). Neither in my Opening Article nor 
in the article it quotes did I state that hate speech restrictions are imposed “merely” for 
these reasons. To the contrary, in the quoted article I write that hate speech 
“undoubtedly causes” psychic injury to members of minority groups and noted the 
possibility that such expression might lead others to discriminate against minorities. See 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 500. What I did claim in my Opening Article is that 
indefensible reasons offered in support of hate speech bans, such as Brown’s invocation 
of the precautionary principle, raise the suspicion that the real motivation for suppressing 
such speech is the “morally repugnant” viewpoint it expresses. Weinstein, supra note 1, 
at 580. See also id. at 579 n.183. 
 116. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 40, at 1107; WEINSTEIN, supra note 103, at 
127-35. 
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vulnerable minorities unsure of their status in society.117 And as I 
also acknowledged in that article, hate speech might even 
damage the political legitimacy that I argue is undermined by 
hate speech laws, a concern I will address in detail later in this 
Reply.118 
With these possible misconceptions cleared up, I will now 
turn to the two main criticisms of my claim that hate speech bans 
impair the legitimacy of downstream legislation, particularly 
antidiscrimination measures. 
B. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS 
Several symposiasts claim that I exaggerate the detrimental 
effect that hate speech bans can have on the legitimacy of 
downstream legislation. Some of the criticism focuses on the 
nature of hate speech bans and deny my contention that such 
bans are viewpoint discriminatory. Other critiques center on the 
extent of the restriction imposed by hate speech laws and 
contend that it is far less than I claim. I will deal with each of 
these points in turn. 
1. The Nature of the Curtailment 
Central to my view about the relationship between free 
speech and political legitimacy is that viewpoint-discriminatory 
speech regulations, that is, laws that forbid people from 
expressing certain viewpoints in public discourse,119 can have 
grave consequences for the legitimacy of downstream legislation. 
In my Opening Article, I cited hate speech bans as an exemplar 
of viewpoint-discriminatory regulation and explored the 
detrimental effect these upstream speech restrictions could have 
on downstream legislation, particularly antidiscrimination laws. 
 
 117. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548, 583. 
 118. Id. at 581–582. 
 119. Waldron is correct that proponents of the legitimacy argument, including me, 
have sometimes been “loose” in describing the nature and extent of curtailment on the 
ability of people to participate in public discourse imposed by speech restrictions. 
Waldron, supra note 2, at 700. He notes, for instance, that in my Opening Article I quote 
an earlier work in which I referred to people being “excluded” from participating in 
public discourse. Id. But far from repeating this language to be as “loose” as I think I can 
“get away with on this matter,” id., I quoted this earlier, broad formulation at the 
beginning of that article to “credit[]” Waldron for “properly criticizing Dworkin and me 
for not adequately specifying” our claim. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 531. So Waldron 
should learn to take “yes” (and a compliment) for an answer. 
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In his Response, Waldron takes issue with my 
characterization of hate speech laws as viewpoint discriminatory. 
Indeed, qualifying his previous position that hate speech laws are 
“undoubtedly content-based,”120 he now argues that they are 
only “sort of content-based.”121 He contends that most hate 
speech laws forbid only expression that is intended to have the 
effect of stirring up hatred against a certain group of people. He 
then notes that because of this intent requirement the “self-same 
proposition” that would violate a hate speech law would not 
come within its prohibition if uttered without the requisite intent 
or under circumstances in which the speaker could not 
reasonably foresee a prohibited effect. For this reason, Waldron 
concludes, hate speech laws “get at content only by virtue of its 
intended effect on the community, rather than on the sole basis 
of the propositions expressed” and therefore are only “sort of 
content-based.” 122 
Waldron’s complicated argument is easily refuted. It is the 
speech that a law prohibits, not that which it leaves unregulated, 
that is relevant to determining whether a law is content-based or 
content-neutral. To use one of Waldron’s own examples, a law 
that prohibits someone from shouting “Fuck!” in public123 is no 
less content based because it does not prohibit people from 
yelling this “self-same” profanity in private.124 Waldron, is, of 
course free to modify his previous conclusion that hate speech 
bans are undoubtedly content based. He cannot, however, avoid 
the persuasiveness of his previous analysis or escape his apt 
 
 120. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701 (citing WALDRON, HATE SPEECH supra note 4, at 
150-55). Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are a subset of content-based laws. See 
Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint 
discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content discrimination.”). Thus, in addition to 
including viewpoint-discriminatory laws, the category of content-based speech restriction 
comprises laws that curtail expression based on its subject matter, its use of particular 
words or symbols or, more generally, because of the communicative impact of the 
speech. 
 121. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701. 
 122. Id. 
 123. WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 182. Though I do not think it is 
viewpoint based. See supra note 120 and infra text accompanying notes 126 to 130. 
 124. While a requirement that the speech must intend to create a certain effect 
cannot eliminate the content-based nature of a speech restriction, it is relevant to the 
extent of the curtailment it imposes on a speaker’s ability to express a particular idea in 
public discourse. This is the issue explored in Part II C, below. In this regard, however, it 
should be noted that it is not at all clear that the British hate speech law, let alone most 
hate speech provisions, imposes a requirement that the speech intend to have the effect 
of stirring up hatred against a certain group of people. See Post, supra note 3, at 653. 
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observation that arguments such as the one he now deploys are 
“casuistry.”125 
Waldron is on somewhat firmer ground in arguing that the 
requirement that hateful ideas “be expressed in a certain 
manner,” such as by the use of “threatening, abusive or 
insulting” language as required by section 18(1) of the UK’s 
Public Order Act, does not prohibit “certain views per se.”126 In 
theory at least a ban on highly vituperative expression might still 
 
 125. WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 151. Waldron’s argument that hate 
speech laws are not content based is similar to the view, noted but “put aside” by Stone, 
that hate speech laws are not viewpoint based because “they are not targeted at 
viewpoints per se but at the harmful consequences of hateful speech.” Stone, supra note 
3, at 689 n.7. Shiffrin may be making something akin to this argument in noting that 
although the United States Supreme Court would find hate speech bans to be 
“impermissible point-of-view discrimination,” the better approach “would be to 
recognize that racist speech causes unjustifiable harm and promoting racial tolerance 
does not.” (Perhaps though Shiffrin is not denying that hate speech laws are viewpoint 
discriminatory but only that they are not impermissibly so.) For all practical purposes, 
this position renders the category of viewpoint discriminatory laws the null set. I take it 
that every participant in this Symposium agrees that it is not acceptable in a liberal 
democracy for government to suppress speech in public discourse because it “disagrees 
with a speaker’s views or because it finds the ideas expressed too disturbing or 
offensive.” See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Accordingly, all restrictions on 
public discourse need to be justified in terms of “the harmful consequences” of the 
speech. But if the harm in question is claimed to result from the expression of a particular 
point of view—be it that democratic governments should be violently overthrown and 
replaced with the dictatorship of the proletariat; that those drafted to fight an unjust war 
should refuse to serve; or that certain racial, ethnic and religious groups are inferior—
then no matter how real and substantial the harm in question, a law suppressing that 
point of view nonetheless is still based on that viewpoint. 
 126. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701–02. Post and Heinze in their Commentaries 
vigorously object to the distinction between the manner and content of expression on 
which Waldron relies. Invoking Percy Bysshe Shelley’s argument about the impossibility 
of translating poetry, Post argues there are “ideas which can be expressed only in the 
particular outrageous style that hate-speech regulations proscribe,” Post, supra note 3, at 
656. Heinze similarly derides what he calls the “form-content” distinction, arguing at 
length that the suppression of particular words, including racial epithets, inevitably 
suppresses ideas. Heinze, supra note 3, at 649–50. I agree that the regulation of the 
manner of expression, including bans on vituperation, can sometimes substantially 
impede speakers from expressing the precise idea they want to convey. For example, 
there is no other way to express the precise idea conveyed by the message “Fuck the 
Draft” emblazoned on an anti-war protestor’s jacket. Still, I do not agree that the 
regulation of the manner of expression has an inevitable suppressive effect on a speaker’s 
ability to convey ideas as Post and Heinze contend. In his Commentary, Blasi attacks the 
form-content distinction from another direction, persuasively arguing that temperate 
hate speech poses a greater danger to the civic standing of vulnerable minority groups 
than does vituperative expression. Blasi, supra note 3, at 589. Accord, WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 103, at 130 (conjecturing that “subtly racist public expression” is more likely to 
instill racist beliefs in others than are pronouncements by “gruesome characters as neo-
Nazis, skinheads and Klansmen.” 
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allow a speaker to convey “something like . . . the propositional 
content” of the view he wants to express.127 So upon further 
reflection,128 I agree with Waldron that in the functional sense I 
am primarily using the term viewpoint discrimination in this 
discussion, that is, preventing a speaker from expressing a 
particular view in public discourse, hate speech laws that do not 
significantly impair a speaker’s ability to express bigoted views 
in public discourse are not viewpoint discriminatory.129 For if a 
speaker can still express the basic propositional content of the 
idea he wants to convey, the regulation would have at most only 
minimal implications for the basic democratic precept of formal 
equality and hence for normative legitimacy.130 But as I 
 
 127. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 135. 
 128. I acknowledged in my Opening Article that despite their discriminatory effect, 
hate speech laws banning only highly vituperative expression might arguably be 
considered viewpoint neutral. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545 n.79. However, I rejected 
that characterization because such laws would likely have a discriminatory effect in that 
such bans would, for instance, prevent a bigot agitating against an antidiscrimination 
measure from referring to members of minority groups as “cockroaches” but would not 
prevent supporters of the antidiscrimination measure from using such epithets to refer to 
bigots. Id. at 545. Nonetheless, I concluded that because a legislature could reasonably 
assume that referring to members of vulnerable racial and ethnic groups as animals we 
normally seek to exterminate could make racial and ethnic minority groups unsure of 
their status in society, the discriminatory effect might under some circumstances be 
justified. Id. at 548. I therefore find it bewildering that Gelber could write that my 
“steeping in the requirement under First Amendment jurisprudence to avoid viewpoint 
discrimination at all costs blinds [me] to the differential harms of these two events.” 
Gelber, supra note 3, at 626. 
 129. In contrast, even if limited to bigoted views expressed with extreme 
vituperation, under American free speech doctrine such a ban would most likely be 
considered viewpoint based. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992). 
In his Commentary, Shiffrin points to speech regulations in the United States that he 
claims to be viewpoint discriminatory but which do not offend the First Amendment. 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 676. With the exception of certain justifications that have been 
offered to justify obscenity laws, which I agree are arguably viewpoint discriminatory in 
the relevant sense (see generally James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First 
Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 865, 893-96 (2007)), the other two 
examples he gives are not analogous to the suppression of hateful ideas about racial, 
ethnic or religious groups. Shiffrin notes that under the defamation law “nasty” 
comments about a person are sometimes actionable, while “nice” statements are 
protected by the First Amendment, and that similarly, under some circumstances 
advocacy of illegal action is unprotected speech, while advocacy of legal action is 
protected. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 677. While these distinctions may in some sense be 
based on a speaker’s viewpoint, they do not single out a particular ideological position 
for suppression as do hate speech laws. As such, they do not have the same implications 
for political legitimacy as do hate speech bans. 
 130. The one important exception is if the selective imposition of the manner 
restriction is not well justified. Suppose, for instance, that anti-war protestors were not 
allowed to shout profanities such as “Fuck the War” in public, while those who 
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demonstrated in my Opening Article and discuss below, 
Waldron’s assertion that “most” hate speech laws ban only 
highly vituperative expression of bigoted views can be seriously 
doubted.131 Rather, in many cases hate speech laws have been 
used to suppress fairly temperate expression. 132 
Finally, Waldron challenges the emphasis I place on 
whether speech restriction is viewpoint discriminatory or instead 
more broadly bans expression in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 
He points out that under both regulations “[s]omeone is still 
being prevented from saying what he wants to say as he says it. 
To that effect there is still an impact on the quality of public 
debate: it is not as it would be if there were no restrictions.” He 
therefore asks, “[W]hy should the nature of the restriction—
viewpoint-based or non-viewpoint-based—make all the 
difference here?”133 
 
supported a country’s war effort could yell “Fuck the Enemy.” In that event, there would 
be a significant effect on normative legitimacy even though the anti-war protestors could 
still convey the basic propositional content of their message. For this reason a poorly 
justified selective regulation of the manner of expression would be viewpoint 
discriminatory as I use that term in this discussion. However, since I believe that a 
selective ban on highly vituperative hate speech, such as referring to members of certain 
vulnerable ethnic and racial groups as “animals we normally seek to exterminate,” 
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335, might in certain circumstances be 
well justified, there would in that case be no significant detriment to normative 
legitimacy worked by the selectivity. Still, as I emphasize in my Opening Article, even if 
such well-justified restrictions do not significantly damage normative legitimacy, they still 
might have a significant detrimental effect on descriptive legitimacy. See Weinstein, 
supra note 1, at 564–65. 
 131. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 542-49; see also infra text accompanying notes 
135 to 142. 
 132. Waldron seems to have upon reflection also slightly modified his position about 
restrictions on the manner of expression and normative legitimacy. He acknowledges 
that “[I]f a citizen thinks of himself as the sort of person who shouts ‘fuck’ or utters 
threats in political debate or shows dirty pictures during his political orations then—I 
don’t know—maybe a case can be made that he is not being respected as such.” Waldron, 
supra note 2, at 713. (He adds that he is “being respected as someone who could be 
better than that, and as someone who has responsibilities as well as rights in the political 
process,” but realizes that this is “another matter.” Id.) So if someone wanting to express 
a particular viewpoint, say an anti-war or anti-abortion protestor or someone wanting to 
express racist views, is selectively forbidden from using profanity in a public debate, one 
might infer that Waldron now agrees with me that a hate ban limited to vituperation has 
somewhat greater impact on normative legitimacy than he previously thought. Shiffrin, in 
contrast, does not even make even this minimal concession, claiming that hate speech 
restrictions do not disrespect the speaker or his equal moral worth but at most only show 
“disrespect for a particular speech choice the citizen would like to make.” Shiffrin, supra 
note 3, at 687. 
 133. Waldron, supra note 2, at 713. 
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The answer to this query is the same as I gave in 
distinguishing his scenario in which someone was 
disenfranchised by onerous ID-requirements or stringent 
restrictions on early voting: viewpoint-discriminatory speech 
restrictions implicate the core precept of equal citizenship in a 
way that non-discriminatory curtailment of political participation 
does not. Compare, for instance, a law that forbids anyone from 
protesting on the sidewalk in front of the United States Supreme 
Court with one allowing protests except for those against the 
Court’s decisions legalizing abortion. Under both laws anti-
abortion demonstrators are “being prevented from saying what 
[they] want to say . . .” But it cannot be seriously gainsaid that 
the viewpoint-based law infringes core democratic equality 
concerns far more than the more extensive yet viewpoint-neutral 
law.134 
2. The Extent of Speech Curtailment 
In my Opening Article I discussed a number of cases in 
which people were arrested, prosecuted or convicted under hate 
speech laws for relatively temperate expression of racist or anti-
Islamic speech or for criticizing homosexuality as immoral or 
disordered.135 Among the cases I discussed were the conviction 
of a Dutch politician for calling for the removal of “all 
Surinamers, Turks and other so-called guest-workers from the 
 
 134. Stone finds it “especially eye-catching” that I invoke the concept of viewpoint 
discrimination as a core principle of freedom of speech “given that in its aversion to 
viewpoint discrimination (like much else) First Amendment law is highly unusual.” 
Stone, supra note 3, at 687. But this aversion to viewpoint discrimination is not just some 
quaint and peculiar detail of American free speech doctrine. It is, rather, a core doctrinal 
rule implemented to vindicate the basic democratic commitment to formal equality and 
the equal moral worth of each citizen and to promote political legitimacy. See Weinstein, 
supra note 1, at 536–37. While the details of free speech doctrine will inevitably and 
properly differ in different democratic societies, there are nonetheless core precepts that 
apply in any democracy, including the right to formal equal participation in the 
democratic process. I am not claiming that any democracy that fails to share American 
free speech doctrine’s broad, fierce version of viewpoint discrimination is betraying this 
core democratic precept. Thus Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 679 n.17, over-reads my position 
when he claims that I believe that Britain’s hate speech ban necessarily involves 
“impermissible” viewpoint discrimination. Cultural differences properly have some 
bearing in determining whether a regulation breaches a core democratic precept in a 
particular society. Nonetheless, I do believe that viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on 
public discourse as I use the term in this article (see supra text accompanying note 129) at 
least directly implicate this core democratic precept even if they do not violate it. 
 135. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58. 
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Netherlands”;136 the fining of a an Austrian academic for saying 
that Mohammad “had a thing for little girls”;137 the fining of 
actress Brigitte Bardot for writing that Muslims were destroying 
France by “imposing their ways”;138 and the unsuccessful 
prosecution of the Catholic Bishop of Belgium for expressing the 
view that homosexuality was a “blockage in normal 
psychological development.”139 I claimed that these and other 
cases show that contrary to Waldron’s assertion, hate speech 
bans “manifestly do not in practice provide a ‘safe haven’ for 
expressing ‘something like the propositional content’ of bigoted 
views that become illegal only ‘when expressed as 
vituperation.’”140 I acknowledged that such applications to 
temperate speech do not “represent the typical hate speech 
case,” which often does involve vituperation.141 I emphasized, 
however, that in evaluating these applications to non-
vituperative speech, we need to consider not just the effect on 
the speakers in these cases but also the “chilling effect” these 
cases would likely have on would-be speakers.142 
In her short yet incisive Commentary, Gelber insists that the 
thirty-two cases that I discuss143 are insufficient in “empirical 
terms”144 to disprove Waldron’s contention that most hate 
speech laws provide a “safe haven” for the temperate expression 
of the basic “propositional content” of the view the speaker 
wants to express. She insists that a “far more in-depth and 
systemic study would be needed regarding the operation of hate 
speech law in practice to sustain this point.”145 Gelber’s criticism 
is well taken. What I should have said is that these cases cast 
considerable doubt on the validity of Waldron’s assertion that 
“most [hate] speech laws bend over backward to ensure that 
there is a lawful way of expressing something like the 
propositional content of views that become objectionable when 
 
 136. Id. at 553. 
 137. Id. at 557–58. 
 138. Id. at 558. 
 139. Id. at 559. 
 140. Id. at 561 (quoting Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335). 
 141. Id. at 560. 
 142. Id. at 559, 562. 
 143. Gelber counts fifteen cases from twelve jurisdictions that I discuss in text, plus 
another seventeen cases discussed in footnotes. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627. 
 144. Id. at 628. 
 145. Id. 
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expressed as vituperation.”146 Or even if Waldron is right that 
the intent of most such laws is to create such “safe havens” for 
non-vituperative expression of bigoted views,147 the cases I 
discuss raise serious concerns whether in practice most hate 
speech laws have actually created such safe zones.148 
I am not sure if Gelber would concur with even these 
modified claims.149 It is interesting to note though that she does 
agree that some of the cases I mention “ought not to have been 
considered hate speech and ought not to have been 
prosecuted.”150 Waldron, in contrast, is remarkably unconcerned 
by the cases I discuss in which no such “safe harbor” was 
provided for non-vituperative expression of bigoted views. The 
entirety of his response to my examples of fairly temperate 
speech having been prosecuted is this: “No doubt there are hate 
speech laws in the world expressed less carefully, with less 
attention to these fastidious distinctions than the British 
provisions I have cited.151 But our debate is about hate speech 
restrictions as such, not about the least well-formulated of 
them.”152 Professor Blasi is surely correct, therefore, when he 
 
 146. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note, 4 at 335. 
 147. Which I take it is what he means by “bend over backward.” 
 148. And, of course, if the thirty-two cases I cite are empirically insufficient to show 
that most hate speech laws fail to create such “safe havens,” then Waldron’s assertion 
that most such laws allow ample opportunity for speakers to express bigoted views 
without vituperation, a claim he supports by reference to two statutes, is far more 
empirically deficient. While this should go without saying, I mention it only because 
Gelber, while properly critical of the empirical limitations of my challenge to Waldron’s 
claim, gives Waldron a pass on the far greater empirical shortcomings of his claim. 
 149. She does suggest though that I would be correct to say that the number of these 
cases is large enough to be “worrying.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 628. 
 150. Gelber notes “in particular the cases in which Christians put forward their views 
about homosexuality.” Id. at 629. Gelber gives no reason for finding these cases 
particularly problematic as compared to the other ones I discuss. It would be interesting 
to know why Gelber does not regard as equally problematic, for instance, the fining of an 
Austrian academic for saying in a seminar that Mohammed had “a thing for little girls.” 
See supra, text accompanying note 137. It would also be worth knowing whether the call 
by the Dutch politician to remove “all Surinamers, Turks and other so-called guest-
workers from the Netherlands,” see supra text accompanying note 136, is in her view hate 
speech that may properly be prohibited in a free and democratic society. 
 151. Waldron, supra note 2, at 703. I tend to agree with Waldron about the British 
hate speech laws. He did not, however, limit his claim to these laws but rather referred to 
“most” hate speech laws. 
 152. Id. Waldron adds that “opponents of hate speech regulation ought to consider 
the best case that can be made for regulation of this sort.” Id. at 703–04. I agree with this 
sentiment and tried to do just that in my one comprehensive discussion of the pros and 
cons of hate speech laws. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 103. But just as opponents of hate 
speech legislation should consider the “best case” for such laws, proponents of such laws 
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observes that “Waldron fails to grapple as fully as he needs to 
with the challenges to his argument” that these cases pose.153 
Gelber also is correct in claiming that there is “insufficient 
evidence” to support my claim that the cases I discuss 
“undoubtedly” have had a “chilling effect” on non-vituperative 
speech.154 Although United States Supreme Court decisions 
frequently rely on such an effect,155 there is surprisingly very 
little empirical support for the existence of this phenomenon.156 
Significantly, however, even if the uncertain reach of many hate 
speech laws does not deter people from expressing views that the 
laws did not in fact mean to ban, it would still be the case that in 
 
should consider the “worst cases” of the application and misapplication of hate speech 
legislation. 
 153. Blasi, supra note 3, at 585. While Waldron is remarkably nonchalant about 
these cases, Brown pretends the most troubling among them simply don’t exist. Brown 
begins this exercise in denial by inaccurately claiming that the “vast majority” of the 
cases I discuss involve not the group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to 
hatred laws that he defends but rather “expression-oriented hate crimes,” specifically, 
public order offences, which he does not. Brown, supra note 3, at 606. In fact, I discuss 
ten public order act cases, hardly a “vast majority” of the thirty-two cases I mention. Of 
the remaining twenty-two cases, fifteen involved incitement to hatred laws and seven 
involved group defamation laws (albeit some not sensu stricto). Brown acknowledges 
only one of these twenty-two cases, Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. Netherlands. He 
ignores the other twenty-one cases, including the cases against a Catholic Bishop, an 
Austrian academic, and Brigitte Bardot discussed supra, text accompanying notes 137 to 
139. 
 154. Gelber, supra note 3, at 628 (quoting Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559). 
 155. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
 156. See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1633, 1681 (2013) (“[T]he existence of a chilling effect . . . is very difficult to 
establish, even with the aid of a variety of sophisticated empirical tools.”). Gelber claims 
that her own research shows “no evidence of chilling effect” from “25 years of the 
operation of hate speech laws in Australia.” Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, The 
Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws: Lessons from Australia, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 
631, 656 (2015). Gelber states that her “analysis of letters to the editor revealed little 
evidence that public discourse has been diminished over the past 25 years” because 
“[r]obust debates have been had on a broad range of issues” and that her “analysis 
revealed the continued expression of prejudice over time.” Id. at 656. She noted that she 
“detected a shift away from more intemperate styles of language,” but concluded that the 
shift “cannot be said to support the chilling effect claim.” Id. While it may be true that 
Gelber’s study shows “no evidence of chilling effect,” it also provides next to “no 
evidence” that the chilling effect does not exist. That in the aggregate the robustness of 
discourse in letters to the editor may not have been diminished since the enactment of 
Australia’s hate speech laws tells us very little about whether particular individuals were 
deterred by these laws from expressing views not within the intended scope of the  
prohibition of these laws in these letters or in other settings for public discourse. So to 
paraphrase Kendrick, Gelber’s study shows that it is “very difficult . . . even with the aid 
of a variety of sophisticated tools” to establish the non-existence of the chilling effect. 
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many jurisdictions someone wanting to call for the removal of 
“so-called guest workers” of certain ethnicities from their 
country; or to condemn Mohammad as a pedophile; or argue 
that Muslims were destroying the country by “imposing their 
ways”; or to claim that homosexuality was a “blockage in normal 
psychological development”;157 would have reasonable grounds 
to fear arrest for doing so. For here it is not just the uncertain 
reach of the laws that may (or may not) “chill” such speech. 
Rather, the deterrence arises from the fact that others have been 
arrested, and in many cases convicted, for conveying precisely 
the views the speaker wants to express. 
There is also merit to Gelber’s objection, echoing Waldron’s 
complaint,158 about my use of cases decided under Section 5 of 
the UK’s Public Order Act to show that there was no “safe 
haven” for relatively temperate expression of expression 
condemning homosexuality or Islam. Gelber writes that if I 
wanted to show “the misapplication of hate speech laws” that it 
would have been helpful if I had limited my inquiry to these 
laws.159 I invoked the Section 5 cases, however, not to bolster my 
claim about misapplication of hate speech laws per se but rather 
to show that even where, as in the UK, the hate speech laws 
might intend to create a safe haven for relatively temperate 
expression, other laws might still prohibit such expression.160 But 
this point would have been clearer if I had considered the 
Section 5 cases separately and not interspersed them with 
misapplication of hate speech laws. 
Still, Waldron is wrong when he says that these Section 5 
cases have “nothing to do with our disagreement about hate 
speech.”161 To the contrary, as Gelber correctly notes, Section 5 
has been “used to shut down what was perceived to be hate 
speech.”162 For instance, in determining that a street preacher’s 
placard referring to homosexuality as immoral violated Section 
5, the Court of Appeal emphasized that “there is a need to show 
 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 136 to 139. 
 158. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 702–03. 
 159. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627. 
 160. Cf. Waldron, supra note 2, at 702 (“Weinstein cites the invocation of section 5 
of the Public Order Act in a number of British cases . . . to illustrate his contention that 
hate speech laws make it quite difficult to safely express the ‘basic propositional content’ 
of bigoted views even when expressed without vituperation or use of vicious epithets.”). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627. 
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tolerance towards all sections of society” and that therefore the 
message on the preacher’s placard “went beyond legitimate 
protest.”163 The Norwood case even more directly involves 
expression punished because it was “perceived to be hate 
speech.” In that case, the penalty for non-vituperative speech 
insulting to Islam (which the Court of Appeal also condemned as 
going “beyond legitimate protest”) was enhanced because the 
expression was “motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility 
towards members of a racial or religious group based on their 
membership in that group.”164 
It is true that the Section 5 cases I discussed do not directly 
impugn the operation of hate speech laws in Britain or 
elsewhere. These cases do, however, put into doubt any claim 
that there is a “safe haven” even in Britain for non-vituperative 
speech critical of homosexuality or insulting to Islam.165 
Moreover, even though the decisions upholding convictions for 
this expression may not have expressly used the term “hate 
speech,” this is precisely the type of expression prohibited by 
hate speech laws in other democracies.166 In the United States, 
 
 163. See Hammond v. Dep’t of Pub. Pros’ns, [2004] EWHC 69, ¶ 5 (Admin), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/69.html. It is true, as Waldron says, 
that analogous to bans on “fighting words,” Section 5 is concerned with public order and 
not as are hate speech laws, with the “proliferation of racial hatred in a community.” 
Waldron, supra note 2, at 702. As this and other cases reveal, however, he is wide of the 
mark in suggesting that as applied Section 5 is not concerned with the proliferation of 
hatred, or at least intolerance, towards homosexuals and religious groups. 
 164. Norwood v. Dir of Pub. Pros’ns, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1564.html. Waldron is correct that 
this provision is a hate crime law, Waldron, supra note 2, at 703, and for that reason I was 
careful not to refer to it as a hate speech provision. But in this case, it was applied to 
speech made criminal by Section 5 and it thus operates with respect to the enhancement 
as a regulation of hate speech. Waldron mentions that he is “not sure” of my views on 
hate crime legislation. As I have written, laws that enhance the punishment for bias-
motivated crimes do not on their face offend free speech principles but can do so in their 
application. See James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. 345 (1994); James Weinstein, First Amendment 
Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where’s the Speech?, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 6 
(1992). I should add by way of disclosure that I was an advisor to the State of Wisconsin 
in its successful defense of hate crime laws in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993). 
 165. I recognize that Waldron did not claim that any such safe haven actually 
existed, but only that, what he believes is typical of hate speech laws in other 
jurisdictions. Britain’s hate speech bans did not extend to non-vituperative expression. I 
do, however, think it relevant that even if Britain’s hate speech law does not seek to 
prohibit non-vituperative bigoted expression, other laws do so precisely because the 
expression is “perceived to be hate speech.” See Gelber, supra note 3, at 627. 
 166. Compare, e.g., Hammond with the prosecution of the Catholic Bishop for 
calling homosexuality disordered (discussed supra text accompanying note 139) and 
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provisions against disorderly conduct are routinely used to 
punish speech, including “fighting words” and true threats. But 
precisely because in the United States hate speech is not a 
category of expression that can be constitutionally suppressed, 
public order acts in the United States cannot be used to punish 
hate speech as such but only if it otherwise constitutes 
unprotected speech.167 
To conclude this discussion of the extent of the actual 
curtailment on expression imposed by hate speech requirements, 
I want to return to the Evangelical Photographer Scenario. In 
my Opening Article I contended that in many jurisdictions with 
hate speech laws on the books someone might reasonably fear 
being arrested, and perhaps even convicted, for expressing the 
view in the public square that homosexuality was immoral. So 
while my “anecdotal claims”168 about how hate speech laws 
actually operate might not have with adequate social scientific 
rigor disproved Waldron’s far less empirically-supported 
assertion about “safe havens” for temperate expression; and 
while there may be little empirical evidence that hate speech 
laws “chill” speech not intended to be proscribed; it is telling 
that no participant in this Symposium denied my claim that it 
would be reasonable for a citizen in many democratic 
jurisdictions with hate speech bans to forego even such relatively 
temperate criticism of homosexuality for fear of arrest. Even in 
the absence of definite proof, the distinct possibility that 
relatively temperate speech in the public square opposing the 
addition of sexual orientation to a nation’s antidiscrimination 
 
Norwood with J. Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 8348/78 and 
8406/78, [1980] 23 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 366 (Eur. Comm’n. on H.R.), 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1979/8.html (discussed supra text accompanying 
note 136). 
 167. Indeed, in accord with American free speech doctrine’s intense hostility to 
viewpoint discrimination, a law that selectively punishes hate speech constituting a public 
order violation is unconstitutional. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
(striking down municipal ordinance for selectively targeting fighting words that arouse 
“anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender”). It is sometimes mistakenly (and carelessly) asserted that R.A.V. held that 
expressive activity at issue in that case—a white juvenile’s placing a burning cross on a 
black family’s lawn—was constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, 
EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 55 (2013). Not only did the 
Court not so hold, but it suggested that this “reprehensible” act (R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396) 
could have been punished consistent with the First Amendment, under any number of 
criminal provisions, including a prohibition of terroristic threats. Id. at 380 n.1. 
 168. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627. 
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laws, or criticizing Islam as part of opposition to a country’s 
immigration policy, should raise real concern about the potential 
of hate speech laws to undermine the legitimacy of downstream 
antidiscrimination laws. 
In response, several commentators argue that legitimacy 
concerns appear on both sides of the equation in that hate 
speech itself can impair political legitimacy by curtailing the 
ability of the subjects of such speech to participate as equals in 
the political process. I agree that any theory grounding free 
speech in political legitimacy must carefully consider any 
countervailing legitimacy interests for speech restrictions. For 
this reason, I raised and discussed this issue in my Opening 
Article and will now respond at length to the various arguments 
made by Commentators that hate speech itself can impair 
legitimacy. 
C. COUNTERVAILING LEGITIMACY CONCERNS AND THE 
“SILENCING” ARGUMENT 
Proponents of hate speech laws often claim that hate speech 
silences its victims. For anyone concerned about political 
legitimacy, this claim must be taken seriously.169 People being 
prevented from participating in public discourse for any reason, 
including by the speech of others, will interfere with the ability 
of those who have been silenced “identify[ing] with the state in 
the manner required by democratic legitimacy.”170 In addition, as 
I explained in my Opening Article, such silencing might render 
immoral the enforcement of particular laws against those whose 
speech has been curtailed.171 The silencing argument, however, 
suffers from a crucial defect: although the claim has been made 
 
 169. For this reason, I took issue in my Opening Article to Heinze’s claim such bans 
can “never promote the state’s democracy.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 581 n.190. 
Although not directly responding to this criticism in his Commentary, Heinze continues 
to insist that viewpoint-based restrictions in public discourse are democratically 
illegitimate in principle. He thus analogizes such restrictions to a single falsified ballot 
case in an election which although its impact will almost always be nil, is still contrary to 
democracy. Heinze, supra note 3, at 645. The analogy is inapt. Unlike a falsified ballot, 
which can never promote democracy, not even theoretically, hate speech bans can 
promote democracy if necessary to prevent bigoted expression from, for instance, 
preventing people from participating in public discourse because they reasonably fear 
they will be physically harmed if they do so. 
 170. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
203 (2015). 
 171. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 581–82. 
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for decades, there is to date at most only meagre evidence that 
hate speech as part of public discourse172—and it is only bans on 
hate speech as part of public discourse that I argue impair 
political legitimacy—prevents anyone from “contribut[ing] to 
public discourse [and] participat[ing] in the formation of public 
opinion.”173 It is important, therefore, to see various silencing 
 
 172. It is true that the line dividing public discourse from other forms of speech may 
be blurry. Still, certain types of speech are clearly not within the domain of public 
discourse, including a “Whites Only” sign on a business establishment, see BROWN, supra 
note 170, at 87; a foreman using the word “nigger” to refer to African-American workers, 
id. at 85; burning a cross on a black family’s lawn, BUTLER, supra note 167, at 55; or 
scrawling anti-Muslim graffiti or placing a racist poster on a mosque, Waldron, HATE 
SPEECH, supra note 4, at 1–2. Even under American free speech doctrine, none of this 
speech is protected, and properly so. Accordingly, the harms caused by such expression 
are irrelevant to whether hate speech that is part of public discourse can appropriately be 
prohibited under a “silencing” or any other rationale. In contrast, someone standing in a 
public square with a sign reading “Stop Homosexuality, Stop Lesbianism, Stop 
Immorality, Jesus is Lord,” see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 555,  plainly is engaging in 
public discourse; as was Brigitte Bardot’s statement on her webpage about Muslims or 
the Catholic Bishop’s comments to a journalist about homosexuals. See supra, text 
accompanying notes 138 to 139. 
 173. Brown, supra note 3, at 612. Nearly 20 years ago, I observed that “the 
proponents of the silencing argument offer no supporting evidence.” WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 103, at 133. Two years later I wrote that although one could imagine a society in 
which “a group is so subordinated and racist speech so prevalent that vicious epithets in 
public discourse will likely impede their participation in democratic self-governance,” 
there was no evidence that I was aware of that hate speech had this effect in the United 
States. See James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American 
Concept of Democracy, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ORDER 
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (T. Hensley ed., 2001). In her Commentary, Gelber 
concedes that “there is not a great deal” of evidence supporting the silencing argument 
but notes that “there are findings from psychology that show that individuals subjected to 
non-physical discrimination suffer significant harms to their physical and mental health.” 
Gelber, supra note 3, at 623. None of these studies, however, focuses on speech as part of 
public discourse and therefore provide no support for the claim that such expression 
causes these harms. In addition, it does not follow that the injuries described in these 
studies will prevent those subject to “non-physical discrimination” from participating in 
public discourse. In addition, Gelber writes that her own empirical research “has shown 
that target communities claim to experience the harms of hate speech alleged in the 
literature,” citing without further discussion Katharine Gelber & Luke J. McNamara, 
Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016). But like the other 
studies she cites, this one also does not distinguish between the harms, including 
silencing, resulting from hate speech as part of public discourse and non-public discourse 
such as face-to-face encounters. The only empirical support that Brown offers for the 
silencing effect other than the Gelber and McNamara study just discussed, is Laura 
Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and 
Antigay Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 341 (2002). See Brown, supra note 3, at 613 n.39. This 
study too suffers from the problem of not specifying if the hate speech was part of public 
discourse or personally directed speech. Of course, although not specified in the studies, 
it may be that some of the speech involved in these studies was public discourse that in 
turn deterred others from participating in public discourse. So under a very charitable 
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arguments proffered in this Symposium for what they really are: 
studious attempts to avoid the problem that there is a “paucity 
of evidence” supporting this argument.174 
1. Silencing, Legitimacy and Hypothetical Consent 
Alexander Brown argues that the “assurance of civic 
dignity” that Waldron emphasizes is “constitutive of the 
realization of political legitimacy.”175 In Brown’s view “political 
legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the legal system, itself 
depends upon it being possible, at least in principle, to justify 
that system to each citizen bound by it on the basis of 
fundamentals of justice that they cannot reasonably reject.”176 
Following this line of reasoning Brown asks: 
[W]ould free and equal people have reasons based on the 
fundamentals of justice to reject an aggressive free speech 
regime that treated hate speech as a protected category even 
though certain forms of hate speech carry a risk of effectively 
removing from some people who are the subject of hate 
 
view of what counts as empirical evidence, Gelber might be right that “[i]t is therefore 
not true that there is no evidence that silencing operates in the ways that defenders of 
hate speech laws allege.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 623 (emphasis added). Still, although 
defenders of hate speech laws have made this silencing argument for decades, the 
evidence that they have been able to produce in support of this theory is remarkably 
paltry. 
 174. As I observed in my Opening Article, Brown had previously noted the 
objection that the silencing argument was supported by a “paucity of evidence.” 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579 (citing BROWN, supra note 170, at 198 (2015)). Tellingly, 
however, Brown in this work did not express disagreement with this objection or cite to 
any evidence supporting the silencing effect. Instead, he sought to avoid this objection by 
invoking the precautionary principle. See BROWN, supra note 170, at 199. Similarly, as 
Brown candidly acknowledges, see Brown, supra note 3, at 613 n.39, it was only after the 
editor of this Symposium suggested that he try to support the silencing argument with 
some evidence that Brown revised his Commentary by citing two articles which he 
asserted without analysis supported the silencing effect. Id. As I discuss in note 173, 
supra, if these studies supply any relevant evidence at all, it is at best meager evidence 
supporting Brown’s claim that hate speech prevents anyone from participating in public 
discourse. But equally as important, that Brown was on at least two occasions content to 
invoke the precautionary principle in the face of the objection that there was “a paucity 
of evidence” supporting the silencing principle without citing to any evidence of such a 
silencing effect, shows just how truly empirically insensitive his argument is. In note 229, 
below, I discuss Shiffrin’s interesting argument that the harms he claims hate speech 
causes need not be supported by empirical studies. 
 175. Brown, supra note 3, at 604 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208). 
 176. Id. at 601 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208). 
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speech real opportunities to contribute to public discourse 
and participate in the formation of public opinion?177 
Brown does not specifically answer this question. But his 
answers to previous iterations of his “process of interpersonal 
justification and consensus” leave little doubt that he thinks the 
answer would be “yes.”178 
I agree that it might be reasonable for “members of 
minority or vulnerable groups”179 to reasonably reject as 
contrary to “fundamentals of justice” an “aggressive free speech 
regime” such as exists in the United States. But the 
reasonableness of this conclusion would depend on such issues 
as: 1) the types and extent of hate speech currently prevalent in 
the society in question; 2) the extent to which these various 
forms of hate speech “carry a risk” of preventing the subjects of 
hate speech from participating in public discourse; 3) whether 
the reaction to the hate speech was reasonable; 4) causes other 
than hate speech for this “silencing” effect; 5) the likelihood that 
hate speech bans will remedy this harm; 6) the availability and 
likely effectiveness of viewpoint-neutral speech restriction, such 
as general bans on threats, fighting words and incitement to 
violence; 7) the availability and likely effectiveness of non-
coercive alternative remedies; 8) the extent to which the 
proposed hate speech laws are likely to be misapplied and thus 
might silence people, including members of “minorities or 
vulnerable groups” from participating in public discourse; and 9) 
the benefits that all members of society,180 including “minorities 
and vulnerable groups derive” from a “free speech regime” that 
“aggressively” protects against viewpoint discrimination. 
The answers to these questions will, of course, vary from 
society to society as well as over time within each society. But 
without careful consideration of these and other largely 
empirical questions, it is impossible to make any meaningful 
judgment about whether it is reasonable to reject the failure to 
 
 177. Id. at 617. 
 178. Brown, supra note 3, at 604. See also infra notes 182 and 184. 
 179. Id. at 601 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208). 
 180. I assume that those engaging in this “process of interpersonal justification and 
consensus” are concerned not exclusively with their own interests but also to some extent 
at least with the fair treatment of other groups in society as well as with the good of 
society as a whole. One of the many problems with Brown’s use of this “process” is it 
does not give us enough information about the parameters of this decision making 
process. 
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enact certain types of hate speech law as contrary to the 
“fundamental justice” required for people being willing to join a 
political community. For this reason, Brown’s “process of 
interpersonal justification and consensus” is incapable of doing 
anything more than showing that “under certain 
circumstances”181 hate speech can have a detrimental impact on 
political legitimacy, either through “silencing” or by inflicting 
other harms,182 a proposition with which I readily agree. 
Significantly, and consistent with this conclusion, Brown’s 
“process of interpersonal justification and consensus” could be 
employed to support an “aggressive” free speech regime that 
would prevent the silencing of legitimate (and legitimating) 
dissent. According to Brown, fundamentals of justice include 
“everyone’s claim to have their welfare counted along with 
everyone else’s welfare in the determination of social policy.”183 
 
 181. See Brown, supra note 3, at 601 (emphasis added). Occasionally Brown 
acknowledges that such rejection will depend on circumstances; but more often this 
qualification is lacking, suggesting that it can be determined from the arm chair. 
 182. The same objection applies to all other iterations of Brown’s use of “the process 
of interpersonal justification and consensus” to try to prove the propriety of the types of 
hate speech laws he supports. Besides invoking it in support of the silencing argument, 
Brown uses this process in his Commentary to make a more direct attempt to prove these 
types of hate speech laws are required by fundamentals of justice and thus promote 
political legitimacy. Brown thus argues that “free and equal people might reasonably 
look upon the adequate protection of their equal civic dignity, such as via group 
defamation laws (sensu stricto) or incitement to hatred laws, as a precondition of any 
notional agreement to joining the political community.” Brown, supra note 3, at 609. He 
adds that “[p]erhaps there are other fundamentals of justice, such as safeguarding 
people’s sense of their physical security, that is, freedom from legitimate fear of acts of 
discrimination or violence, that are also preconditions for any notional agreement to 
joining the political community, and that would also require laws, including incitement to 
hatred laws, that combat hate speech that contributes to a climate of fear.” Id. at 609–10. 
I agree that free speech doctrine so “aggressive” or “absolutist,” Brown, supra note 3, at 
601, that it forbids speech restrictions needed to adequately protect civic dignity or 
prevent legitimate fear of acts of discrimination or violence will diminish the legitimacy 
of the legal system with respect to the subjects of hate speech. But as with the silencing 
argument, whether it would be reasonable to reject the failure of a legal system to enact 
the type of hate speech laws he supports as contrary to “fundamentals of justice” 
depends on a number of crucial empirical inquiries. The same goes for Brown’s 
argument, considered in my Opening Article, that it would be reasonable for members of 
minority or vulnerable groups to reject as contrary to fundamentals of justice the 
justification for not enacting hate speech laws that such laws may impair the legitimacy of 
downstream laws from which these groups benefit. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576–
78. As I have emphasized, pertinent to this inquiry is the application of hate speech laws 
in actual operation to temperate criticism of homosexuality and Islam, a phenomenon 
that Brown largely ignores. See supra, text accompanying notes 135 to 142. 
 183. Brown, supra note 3, at 601 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: 
The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1626 n.127 (2010)). 
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It could therefore be argued that those who hold traditional 
religious beliefs (among others who may want to vigorously 
challenge current political orthodoxy) might reasonably reject as 
contrary to fundamental justice any legal regime that permitted 
viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse, including hate 
speech bans, on the grounds that even if narrowly drafted such 
laws would in actual practice present “a risk of effectively 
removing from some people . . . real opportunities to contribute 
to public discourse and participate in the formation of public 
opinion.”184 As with Brown’s use of the process of interpersonal 
justification and consensus to argue against “aggressive” free 
speech regimes, whether rejection of hate speech bans as 
contrary to fundamentals of justice is reasonable would depend 
on a host of empirical inquiries including the scope of the speech 
restriction and whether it would prevent even temperate 
criticism of homosexuality (or some other currently dominant 
opinion in society). So, all that “the process of interpersonal 
justification and consensus” is capable of doing is showing that 
both hate speech bans and hate speech itself can potentially 
 
 184. In my Opening Article, I pointed out that there was an incommensurability 
problem in weighing the loss of systemic legitimacy that Brown claimed resulted from 
hate speech itself against the loss of legitimacy to particular laws that I claimed resulted 
from hate speech laws. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577. In his Commentary, Brown 
insists that his account of political legitimacy does have the “wherewithal” to respond to 
my claim about loss of legitimacy to downstream laws caused by hate speech bans. 
Brown, supra note 3, at 603. Brown writes that he would tell those whose speech was 
curtailed by hate speech laws that because the conduct prevented by downstream 
antidiscrimination laws is “clearly unjust” they have an obligation to obey these measures 
even if “to some extent the[ir] collective authorization” and “democratic legitimacy” has 
been reduced by the upstream speech restriction. Id. at 603–04. He adds that these 
people should keep in mind that these laws “curb forms of hate speech that can be 
corrosive of a shared, public sense of the basic elements of people’s equal status and 
dignity as members of society in good standing.” Id. at 604. Like all his uses of “the 
process of interpersonal justification and consensus,” whether those whose speech has 
been curtailed can reasonably reject this proposition depends on numerous empirical 
inquires, including once again the extent of speech curtailment and thus the amount of 
reduction of “collective authorization” and “democratic legitimacy” resulting from these 
allegedly “narrowly framed” laws in actual operation. Id. at 603–04. Aside from failing to 
address these crucial empirical questions, Brown’s attempt to justify these laws to 
dissenters has the added defect of talking past my basic critique of hate speech bans and 
political legitimacy. As I make clear, I share Brown’s view that the moral interest in 
preventing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation in 
“jobs, housing, transport, services, and so forth,” id. at 603, is so strong that it will be a 
rare case in which a speech restriction can put in doubt the morality of enforcing such 
laws. See Weinstein, supra note 1. The Evangelical Photographer scenario was meant to 
represent such a rare yet realistic case. Rather than engage this challenge, Brown simply 
ignores it. 
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damage political legitimacy, a proposition that I expressly 
acknowledged in my Opening Article. 
Finally, even if in a particular mature, stable democratic 
society it was reasonable for “minority and vulnerable groups” 
to reject the failure to enact a particular type of hate speech laws 
as contrary to “the fundamentals of justice,” difficult empirical 
(as well as normative) questions would remain as to the extent of 
the damage the failure to enact these types of hate speech laws 
has inflicted on the legal system.185 And precisely because 
legitimacy is potentially on both sides of the equation, this 
reduction in legitimacy would then have to be balanced against 
the damage to the legitimacy of the legal system that hate speech 
bans would likely cause.186 
 
 185. See id. at 604–05. Thus Brown does not argue that the failure to enact hate 
speech laws entitles “minority and vulnerable groups” “to rise up in revolution” (see 
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 332) because their civic dignity and sense 
of security is not adequately protected. Rather, consistent with my view (adapting Dahl) 
about viewpoint-based speech restrictions diminishing the “reservoir” of a legal system’s 
legitimacy, see supra note 43, Brown argues that the failure of hate speech laws makes 
the legal system “less politically legitimate than it could be.” Brown, supra note 3, at 610. 
 186. In this regard, it should be noted that the scope of hate speech restrictions that 
Brown argues for is considerably broader than the one that Waldron defends. Thus in 
addition to incitement to hatred laws and group defamation laws (sensu stricto) Brown 
supports “regulations limiting the use of negative stereotyping or stigmatization, and 
perhaps even Holocaust denial legislation.” BROWN, supra note 170, at 214. See also id. 
at 146, criticizing Waldron for “overlooking other kinds of laws that might also be said to 
protect the high and equal sociological status of vulnerable groups.” Brown, however, 
resists any tradeoff between the promotion of political legitimacy he argues results from 
hate speech bans and the damage to such legitimacy that I argue that such bans might 
cause. Rather, he asserts “that political legitimacy takes lexical priority over and, 
therefore, cannot be traded off against, the collective authorisation or democratic 
legitimacy of downstream laws.” Brown, supra note 3, at 600. I am not sure whether 
Brown means to confine this claim of priority to bar such tradeoff to cases involving 
damage to legitimacy of downstream laws or to extend this priority to bar any proposed 
tradeoff between the loss of legitimacy he identifies through the “process of 
interpersonal justification and consensus,” on the one hand, and the loss of systemic 
legitimacy that I and others argue can result from speech restrictions, on the other. But 
there is no need to pursue this question, for Brown merely asserts but does not argue for 
this priority. Relabeling the detriment to political legitimacy arising from speech 
restrictions that I stress in this Symposium as “collective authorisation or democratic 
legitimacy” while reserving the term “political legitimacy” for his account of legitimacy is 
surely not an argument for such priority. And I can think of no reason why the legitimacy 
concerns that Brown derives from a theory based in hypothetical consent should 
categorically take priority over legitimacy concerns that I and others derive from a 
theory of political participation based on formal equality. 
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2. Silencing and the Precautionary Principle 
In my Opening Article I remarked that Brown’s invocation 
of the precautionary principle187 to compensate for the lack of 
evidence supporting the silencing argument turned “a 
problematic though plausible argument into a plainly 
indefensible one.”188 In his Commentary, Brown continues to try 
to defend the indefensible. He begins by discussing arguments 
for banning hate speech as a prophylactic measure against 
genocide or “terrorist atrocities” that threaten national 
security.189 He then refers to these “grave and irreversible” 
harms as “equivalent to the devastating climate change harms 
that are associated with the precautionary principle in the field 
of environmental regulation.”190 But having invoked these 
catastrophic harms, Brown then concedes that none of the harms 
that he argues justify suppression of hate speech, including its 
alleged silencing effect, is “of the same magnitude of gravity” as 
genocide, terroristic attacks threatening national security or 
 
 187. As my colleague Gary Marchant has observed, “there is no standard text” for 
the precautionary principle. Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule: 
Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary Principle, 111 ETHICS & ENVTL. 
HEALTH 1799, 1800 (2002). However, he notes that each formulation of the principle 
shares the prescription that “scientific certainty is not required before taking preventive 
measures.” Id. In contrast, he observes that there is great variance among various 
formulations of the principle in the level of threat necessary to trigger the principle. Id. 
Brown does not expressly adopt a particular formulation of the precautionary principle. 
But in discussing the evidentiary uncertainty of the effectiveness of hate speech bans, 
Brown writes: “According to what I shall call the Precautionary Principle, where the 
effects of doing nothing to reduce hate speech are sufficiently grave or serious, evidential 
uncertainty about what measures are minimally effective in reducing hate speech/the 
evils of hate speech ought not be used as a basis for not pursing measures that could be 
effective.” BROWN, supra note 170, at 247. Note the potentially significant difference 
between lack of “scientific certainty,” which Marchant reports is common to all versions 
of the precautionary principle and Brown’s idiosyncratic reference to mere “evidential 
uncertainty.” The former standard means that there does not have to be conclusive proof 
to justify remedial measures, while the latter formulation would support, as Brown 
argues for, remedies based on even the most meager evidence. In his Commentary, 
Brown writes that there must be “at least some minimally adequate evidence that the 
relevant activities have certain effects and that these effects are potentially harmful in 
order to” apply the precautionary principle. Brown, supra note 3, at 613. He does not, 
however, specify what standards are to be applied to determine the evidence in question 
is “minimally adequate.” Rather he merely asserts “this threshold has been met for hate 
speech and various types of silencing effect,” citing without discussion the two studies 
discussed in note 173, supra. 
 188. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580. 
 189. Brown, supra note 3, at 611–12. 
 190. Id. at 612. 
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climate change.191 He insists, though, that harms from hate 
speech that he thinks justify its suppression, including the 
silencing effect, “are potentially more probable harms and more 
proximate harms, causally speaking.”192 It is the greater 
probability and closer causal connection between hate speech 
and harm that in Brown’s view put the silencing effect on par 
with genocide, terroristic atrocities and global warming so far as 
invocation of the precautionary principle is concerned. 
Accordingly, he concludes that these factors justify putting a 
heavy burden of proof on those who oppose hate speech bans to 
show that the silencing effect will not occur if hate speech is left 
unregulated.193 
There are at least four salient defects with this remarkable 
argument. First, Brown does not claim that on the scale of 
gravity of harm, the silencing effect even approaches genocide, 
terroristic atrocities or global warming. So invocation of these 
truly catastrophic harms is largely a distraction. In addition, 
Brown’s argument is question begging. That hate speech is 
potentially more likely and proximately to deter people from 
participating in public discourse than it is to lead to genocide or 
to threaten national security tells us next to nothing about how 
likely in any given society hate speech is to deter people from 
participating in public discourse. But it is this probability that 
Brown relies on to justify applying the precautionary principle.  
The most remarkable problem with Brown’s argument, 
however, is the dearth of evidence that he contends justifies 
applying the precautionary principle to impose a particularly 
heavy burden of proof on those who oppose hate speech bans. 
To trigger application of the precautionary principle, proponents 
of hate speech bans would have to adduce only “some minimally 
adequate evidence” of the silencing effect.194 It is one thing to 
invoke the precautionary principle to avoid a catastrophic or 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. Brown also notes that although the silencing effect is not “strictly 
irreversible,” it is not “easily reversible.” Id. 
 193. Specifically, those opposing the bans would have to produce evidence 
“sufficiently rigorous, comprehensive and abundant to command a consensus among the 
relevant body of experts” that the hate speech if left unregulated would not have a 
silencing effect. Id. at 613. In contrast, to invoke the precautionary principle, and thus 
shift the burden of proof, those supporting hate speech bans would have to produce only 
“some minimally adequate evidence” of the silencing effect. Id. 
 194. See supra note 187. 
11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:59 AM 
766 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:715 
 
perhaps even a non-catastrophic though serious harm in the 
absence of “scientific certainty” that the harm will occur.195 It is 
quite another to invoke the principle when the evidence of a 
serious but non-catastrophic harm can meet the vague “some 
minimally adequate evidence” standard. Use of this heretofore 
unknown standard to trigger the precautionary principle seems 
especially concocted to fit the meagre evidence at hand.  
Finally, and relatedly, Brown fails to take account of the 
risks of applying the precautionary principle to ban hate speech 
arising from the misapplications of these laws that I have 
discussed. As Professor Cass Sunstein has explained, any 
application of the precautionary principle that does not consider 
“the risks on both sides of a decision” is “deeply incoherent.”196 
Indeed, if as Brown argues probability and proximate cause are 
to be given the decisive weight in supporting the propriety of 
applying the precautionary principle, a better case might be 
made that the principle supports not enacting hate speech bans. 
In light of the meagre evidence that has been produced in 
support of the silencing effect in most mature and stable 
democracies, it could be strongly argued that imposing criminal 
sanctions for expressing hateful views in public discourse would 
more likely and more proximately silence people from 
expressing their views in public discourse than does hate speech 
itself.  
In the course of making this remarkably weak argument for 
application of the precautionary principle Brown does, however, 
give a plausible answer to my longstanding query of what 
principle would “justify shutting up A (or a group of As) so that 
B (or a group of Bs) can speak?”197 Brown argues that 
criminalizing the types of hate speech that he identifies for 
suppression will “will not stop the speaker from expressing him 
or herself in other permissible ways.” In contrast, he continues, 
“in the event that hate speech has a silencing effect on those who 
are its subjects, the effect is just that, silence; it can cause people 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Cass R. Sunstein, Throwing Precaution to the Wind, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2008, 
at C1. 
 197. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579–80. As noted in that article, id. at 580 n.186, 
Jill Hasday also suggested a plausible answer to this query, namely, that the number of 
Bs being silenced by the hate speech is greater than the number of As who will be 
silenced by the hate speech ban. 
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not to speak in any way.”198 Of course, hate speech will not 
(unless it causes death or a catatonic state) literally “cause 
people not to speak in any way.” It might conceivably, though, 
even in a mature and stable democracy prevent people from 
engaging in public discourse not just on particular subjects, but 
entirely. Such an asymmetry between the extent of silencing 
caused by hate speech and hate speech bans might depending on 
the size of each group provide a principle for shutting up a group 
of As so that a group of Bs can speak. Indeed, if there was 
persuasive evidence that hate speech in a certain society was 
preventing a large group of people from participating in public 
discourse entirely, it might be appropriate to invoke the 
precautionary principle in support of hate speech laws even in 
the absence of “scientific certainty” that such harm was 
occurring or was imminent. But evidence for such a 
“catastrophic antidemocratic outcome”199 is even more wanting 
than it is for the usual silencing argument. 
In concluding this discussion of Brown’s use of the 
precautionary principle, I want to take a page out of Waldron’s 
book (or rather some phrases from his Response): I wonder if 
such a strong, idiosyncratic, empirically-insensitive200 version of 
the precautionary principle is not “just being wheeled into the 
hate speech debate” as a theory “rigged up for the purpose of 
the hate speech debate.”201 As Waldron correctly notes, one way 
of showing that a principle is “not rigged” is to follow it where it 
leads.202 So I am curious whether Brown would be willing to 
apply this version of the precautionary principle to suppress anti-
war protests if a couple of studies provided not particularly 
relevant evidence that such protests might lead to significant 
harms to a war effort, such as interference with recruitment of 
personnel. In this regard, it should be noted that these harms are 
“potentially more probable harms and more proximate harms, 
causally speaking”203 than graver harms that possibly could result 
from anti-war protests, such as increased battlefield casualities 
and even the loss of the war resulting from expression that 
dispirits our troops and encourages the enemy. 
 
 198. Brown, supra note 3, at 614–15. 
 199. BROWN, supra note 170, at 199. 
 200. See supra note 174. 
 201. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 700. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Brown, supra note 3, at 612. 
11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:59 AM 
768 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:715 
 
3. Silencing and the Burden of Proof 
Rather than trying to shift the burden of proof to those who 
oppose hate speech laws as does Brown, Adrienne Stone makes 
the more modest claim that “there is no reason, in the absence of 
evidence on silencing, to err on the side of free speech.”204 There 
is, in fact, a very powerful, and it seems to me conclusive, reason 
for erring on the side of free speech. Or more precisely, there is 
a good reason in our present state of knowledge for not enacting 
hate speech laws if making sure that people are not prevented 
from asserting certain views in public discourse is the goal. It is 
indisputable that hate speech bans prevent people from 
expressing certain views in public discourse.205 Silencing the 
expression of certain views is after all is the purpose of such 
laws.206 In contrast, as Gelber concedes, there is “not a great 
deal” of evidence that hate speech causes such silencing.207 In 
any event, Stone’s claim about on which side we should err 
assumes for the sake of argument that there is not just meagre 
evidence of the silencing effect but rather an “absence of 
evidence on silencing.” If and when there is persuasive evidence 
that hate speech as part of public discourse actually prevents 
members of minority or other vulnerable groups from expressing 
some viewpoint in public discourse, or worse yet, prevents them 
from participating in such discourse altogether, a very difficult 
problem will be presented. For under these circumstances it will 
have to be determined whether a greater degree of silencing, and 
hence potential damage to political legitimacy, is likely to be 
produced by hate speech bans or by hate speech itself.208 But in 
 
 204. Stone, supra note 3, at 695 (emphasis added). 
 205. See, for example, the cases discussed in Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58 and 
summarized supra in text accompanying notes 135 to 138. 
 206. I am assuming here that the intended (let alone effective) scope of the ban is 
not just on highly vituperative expression as Waldron imagines. Rather, in accord with 
bans actually on the books, I am assuming that the scope of bans are along the lines of 
those endorsed by Brown, which prohibit group defamation (sensu stricto), incitement to 
hatred and perhaps even Holocaust denial. See supra note 186. These restrictions plainly 
do not leave speakers free, even theoretically, to express the basic “propositional 
content” of certain views. 
 207. See supra note 173. 
 208. Curiously, Gelber claims that I fail “to acknowledge what would happen to [my] 
argument if [I] were to concede that hate speech itself is capable of undermining the 
equal opportunity in decisionmaking” that we both agree is “fundamental to political 
legitimacy.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 624. In fact, I specifically addressed this situation in 
the scenario in which hate speech prevents members of an indigenous population from 
speaking in public discourse in favor of an exemption from drug law prohibition of a 
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the absence of any evidence of the silencing effect of hate 
speech, or even with what is at best meagre evidence of such an 
effect that has been proffered to date, we should indeed “err on 
the side of freedom of speech” so far as avoiding damage to 
political legitimacy is concerned. 
4. Silencing and Speech-Act Theory 
Relying on an influential essay by Professor Rae Langton,209 
Gelber and Stone argue that hate speech might silence members 
of historically-oppressed groups, not only literally by keeping 
them from speaking as Brown alleges,210 but also by disabling 
them from conveying the meaning their words ordinarily would 
import. Langton argues that the way women are portrayed in 
pornography might have such a disabling effect on a woman’s 
ability to say “no” to man’s sexual advances. On this view, a man 
who consumes pornography might simply not understand what 
the woman is trying to convey by saying “no,” thereby rendering 
her ability to convey her lack of consent “unspeakable.”211 It 
may be that pornography has some role in contributing to the 
deranged belief of too many men even in modern democracies 
that when a woman says “no” to a sexual advance she does not 
mean “no.”212 Neither Gelber nor Stone, however, suggests an 
equivalent form of silencing arising from hate speech. 
Significantly, they do not even speculate on how hateful 
 
substance they use in their religious ceremonies. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580–81. I 
acknowledge that in such a situation banning hate speech to promote the political 
legitimacy of downstream legislation would be justified if 1) the gain in legitimacy at least 
marginally exceeds the detriment to legitimacy caused by the speech restriction; and 2) 
there were no non-speech restrictive means by which government could ameliorate the 
“silencing effect” of the hate speech. (Both of these caveats stem from the basic liberal 
precept that the government always bears the burden of justifying the use of coercion, 
with the weight of this burden varying depending upon the various interests at stake.) I 
took a similar position with respect to resolving conflicting claims concerning systemic 
legitimacy. See id. at 580 n.186. 
 209. Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 293 
(1993). 
 210. Using terminology employed by Professor J.L. Austin, Langton refers to this 
type of silencing as “speakers fail[ing] to perform even a locutionary act.” Id. at 315. 
 211. Id. at 324. Langton refers to this type of silencing as “illocutionary 
disablement.” Id. at 315 (emphasis deleted). 
 212. See Jennifer Hornsby, Speech Acts and Pornography, in THE PROBLEM OF 
PORNOGRAPHY (Susan Dwyer ed., 1995). See also, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Texas Tech Frat 
Loses Charter Following ‘No Means Yes, Yes Means Anal’ Display, HUFFPOST (Oct. 9, 
2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/texas-tech-frat-no-means-yes_n_595330
2.html. 
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expression as part of public discourse might deprive a participant 
in public discourse of the ability to convey her message in a way 
analogous to pornography’s purported silencing effect on a 
woman trying to verbally refuse a sexual advance. 
Rather, Gelber and Stone, in addition to discussing the 
literal silencing effect claimed by Brown,213 may be arguing that 
vilification of members of historically-oppressed groups can 
impair the ability of those so villified to effectively convey their 
views.214 I agree that it is likely that those persuaded by hate 
speech defaming, for instance, African-Americans, Muslims, or 
Jews, would tend to discount anything members of these groups 
have to say on matters of public concern. But while it is 
important to recognize this unhappy consequence of hate 
speech, preventing this harm is, in my view, not an appropriate 
reason for suppressing expression in any society in which “public 
opinion . . . is the final source of government.”215 Unfair 
characterization of people, or groups of people, likely to have 
such an effect is by no means confined to hate speech. Rather, it 
is a regrettable feature of public debate on virtually any subject 
but especially with discussion of contentious, highly-ideological 
issues. It would be difficult to find a principled ground for 
 
 213. For instance, Gelber posits that homophobic speech in public discourse causes 
same-sex couples to become “fearful of walking down the street holding hands, and 
fearful of violent attacks against them and their property.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 622. 
She then asks whether this reasonable fear and knowledge of the experiences of other 
same-sex attracted people might mean that this “same sex couple could be silenced in 
much the same way” as the Evangelical Photographer in the scenario in my Opening 
Article felt unable to express her views about a pending bill to extend public 
accommodation antidiscrimination to include sexual orientation. Id. See also Stone, supra 
note 3, at 691–92. It is possible that even in some mature, stable democracies 
homophobic speech in public discourse reasonably deters same-sex couples from publicly 
supporting a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in much that 
same way as I posited that hate speech laws deterred the photographer in my scenario 
from opposing such a law. But given the paucity of evidence supporting the silencing 
effect of hate speech, see supra note 173, including of homophobic speech, as part of 
public discourse on those wishing to engage in public discourse, it is difficult to make any 
meaningful assessment of this possibility. And as discussed above, Gelber’s own research 
does not differentiate between hate speech constituting public discourse and that which 
does not; nor does it distinguish between those deterred from participating in public 
discourse from other types of “silencing.” Id. Accordingly, it does little to support her 
“belie[f],” Gelber, supra note 3, at 622, that such silencing exists. 
 214. This was an argument made by Owen Fiss in his IRONY AND FREE SPEECH 
(1996) and critiqued by me in Taking Liberties with Free Speech, 12 L. & PHIL. 159 (1998) 
(book review). 
 215. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
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limiting this variation of the silencing argument to hate speech.216 
Without such a limitation, however, it would provide a rationale 
for government to suppress a large swath of public discourse that 
must be allowed in a free and democratic society. 
D. HATE SPEECH AS CONSTITUTING HARM 
Again relying on Langton, Gelber in several places in her 
Commentary insists that hate speech does not just lead to harm 
but by its very utterance constitutes harm. For instance, Gelber 
writes that “the defining features of hate speech are . . . that it 
incurs harms discursively when the hate speech is uttered, and 
that these harms are analogous to other discriminatory harms, 
such as denying someone a service or denying them a job on the 
ground of their race.”217 Significantly, however, Gelber does not 
explain or give an example of how hate speech in public 
discourse can constitute a harm analogous to the ones she 
mentions. I can easily imagine how speech outside of public 
discourse, for instance an employer calling his black employees 
“niggers,” or a “Whites Only” sign on a the door of a restaurant, 
could be said to constitute harm rather than just lead to race 
discrimination in employment or public accommodation.218 In 
contrast, while I agree that hate speech within public discourse 
might lead to discrimination against members of vulnerable 
minority groups,219 I am unable to think of a plausible example 
 
 216. Accord Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity, and Law: Pornography, 
Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 326-28 (1988). For a detailed 
response to the silencing argument, including this variation, as it pertains to hate speech, 
see Post, supra note 92, at 306-17. 
 217. Gelber, supra note 3, at 620–21. See also id. at 625 n.21. Gelber claims that like 
Ronald Dworkin in his debate with Langton, I “speak[] past” and appear “not to hear or 
recognize” these claims of the constitutive harm in hate speech. Id. at 622. But I am 
afraid that once again it is Gelber who does not “appear . . . to recognize” that my 
Opening Article was not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of the multifarious 
arguments for and against hate speech regulation (and it certainly did not intend to 
discuss the regulation of pornography). Rather, having dedicated the bulk of that article 
to considering how hate speech bans might deprive particular downstream laws of 
legitimacy, I felt it appropriate to consider also how hate speech itself might deprive 
particular laws of legitimacy. Not addressing every argument in the literature that might 
have some bearing on countervailing legitimacy concerns is hardly “talking past” or “not 
hearing” these arguments. 
 218. See supra note 172. 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
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of how such speech constitutes harm analogous to the examples 
just mentioned.220 
E. THE SEARCH FOR A CABINABLE RATIONALE 
SUPPORTING HATE SPEECH BANS 
A daunting challenge for those supporting hate speech bans 
is to find a rationale for excluding hate speech that would also 
not justify suppression of speech they believe should not be 
banned in a free and democratic society.221 I am not denying that 
such a principle exists. Indeed, the justification of the 
suppression of hate speech on the grounds that it prevents others 
from expressing views in public discourse or, worse yet, from 
participating in this public discussion altogether, might provide 
such a rationale.222 The problem with this silencing argument is 
not conceptual but empirical, for as we have seen, there is scant 
evidence that hate speech has such a silencing effect in any 
mature and stable democracy. I have already alluded to the 
untenable scope of various rationales that participants in this 
Symposium have offered to try to obviate this glaring 
evidentiary problem.223 But the problem of overly broad 
 
 220. Frederick Schauer suggests that the harm caused by hate speech might be 
constitutive of harm in much the same way as would the disclosure of a secret algorithm 
used by the Internal Revenue Service to determine whom to audit. Schauer, supra note 3, 
at 666. The analogy is inapt. The harm in the disclosure of the algorithm, and the 
government’s justification for prohibiting the disclosure, concern predominately, if not 
exclusively, the facilitative rather than the persuasive power of speech. In contrast, the 
harm in hate speech as part of public discourse, and the government’s reasons for 
prohibiting such expression, is usually concerned, at least in significant part, with the 
persuasive power of hate speech, such as its ability to persuade people to have false 
beliefs about members of minority groups or to “stir up” hatred against them which in 
turn might lead to acts of discrimination or even violence. One of the merits of Waldron’s 
argument in support of the narrow hate speech bans he supports is that the harm he 
emphasizes—causing members of vulnerable minority groups to feel insecure about their 
status in society—is not concerned with the persuasive power of speech in this sense. 
Nonetheless, even this harm is not caused by facilitative speech analogous to the speech 
in Schauer’s example. An example of facilitative hate speech analogous to that in 
Schauer’s hypothetical would be a list on a neo-Nazi website of the home address and 
telephone number of prominent Jews, along with the names and addresses of the school 
their children attend. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between persuasive and 
facilitative speech and the implication of this distinction for freedom of expression, see 
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Free Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 211-12 (1972). 
 221. I discuss this problem at length in WEINSTEIN, supra note 103. 
 222. Similarly, a ban on only the most vituperative forms of hate speech that leaves 
speakers free to express the basic propositional content of their bigoted views might in 
theory provide such a cabinable principle if it could be shown that vituperative racist 
expression is more harmful than vituperation in other contexts. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 203 and 216. 
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rationales for suppressing hate speech is sufficiently troubling to 
warrant a more focused discussion.  
Proponents of hate speech bans, including several 
participants in this Symposium, make arguments that would also 
apply to speech that I am confident they believe must be allowed 
in a free and democratic society. I have already discussed how 
under Brown’s version of the precautionary principle anti-war 
speech could readily be banned.224 And so too under this 
rationale, government could ban the mere glorification of 
terrorism or advocacy of anti-democratic forms of government, 
including communism.225 Similarly, Stone’s view that there is no 
reason “to err on the side of free speech, in the absence of 
evidence of silencing”226 would apply to suppressing speech to 
prevent other serious harms even without evidence of their 
existence.  
In the much the same way, the speech-act theory that Stone 
and Gelber invoke in support of suppressing hate speech could 
readily be applied to speech that I believe they would not agree 
could be properly suppressed. I have already discussed how one 
particular version of a silencing argument would justify 
suppressing any view in public discourse that arguably has that 
effect.227 In addition, like Brown’s precautionary principle, their 
argument that hate speech in public discourse can be banned 
because it not just causes but “constitutes” discrimination could 
be invoked to suppress anti-war speech condemning the draft as 
“constituting” draft resistance.228 Finally, even Shiffrin’s 
nuanced, harm-based rationale for suppressing hate suffers from 
this overbreadth problem. 
 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
 225. Indeed, Brown’s idiosyncratic version of the precautionary principle bears an 
uncanny and troubling resemblance to Chief Justice Vinson’s perversion of the clear and 
present danger test in his plurality opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951), a decision which upheld convictions of the leaders of the American Communist 
Party. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 226. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 228. As such it would through a different rationale bring us back to the notorious 
lack of protection provided anti-war protestors in the United States and other 
democracies during World War I. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); 
James Weinstein & Ivan Hare, General Introduction: Free Speech and the Suppression of 
Extreme Speech Past and Present, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, 
at 2–3. 
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According to Shiffrin, hate speech causes the following 
harms:  
it is an assault on the dignity of people of color; it humiliates 
and causes emotional distress, sometimes with physical 
manifestations; it helps spread racial prejudice, not only 
stigmatizing people of color in the eyes of the societally 
dominant race but also in the eyes of [many of] the victims 
themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and . . . finally, it 
frequently creates the conditions for violence.229 
Although Shiffrin does not maintain that these harms are 
sufficient to suppress full-value public discourse, he does insist 
that they are sufficient to suppress hate speech because such 
expression ranks “low in the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values.”230 What makes hate speech “low value” expression in 
Shiffrin’s view is that in addition to being harmful, those 
engaging in such expression “seek to topple the fundamental 
prerequisites of a legitimate society and government,” including 
“the system’s foundational premise of equality.”231 The problem 
with this “low value” speech rationale is that it can be used to 
suppress advocacy of radical political change, including certain 
forms of Marxist speech. Like racist speech, advocacy of the 
violent overthrow of democratic institutions can “create[] the 
conditions for violence.” And since advocacy of violent 
overthrow of democratic governemnt seeks “to topple the 
fundamental prerequisites of a legitimate society and 
government,” such expression can on Shiffrin’s account be 
deemed “low value” expression suppressible even in the absence 
of the showing of harm needed to suppress full-value speech. 
 
 229. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 77 nn.168–69 (2000)). 
Shiffrin acknowledges that these claims of harm “do not depend on empirical studies, but 
the experiences of human beings. When speech lacks a strong connection to the values 
underlying the First Amendment, at least in my view, a demand for empirical studies 
before regulation is not defensible.” Id. at 677 n.14 While I disagree with Shiffrin that a 
demand for empirical evidence is “indefensible” just because speech lacks a “strong 
connection” to free speech values, I agree with him that under such circumstances a 
lesser quantum of empirical proof is usually justified. This is why, for instance, 
commercial speech is properly regulated in some respect on less definite showing of harm 
than is public discourse. Where we disagree is whether hate speech in public discourse 
lacks such a strong connection. Finally, I share Shiffrin’s view that hate speech causes 
many of these harms. What I am uncertain about is the extent and frequency of several 
of these harms, a question that only empirical studies might help answer. 
 230. Id. at 677. 
 231. Id. at 678. 
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Indeed, it is precisely this rationale that a plurality of the United 
States Supreme Court used to uphold the conviction of high 
ranking members of the American Communist Party for 
violation of the Smith Act.232 
It is worth emphasizing that I am not here making a 
“slippery slope” argument. Unlike a slippery slope rationale, my 
claim says nothing about what other forms of speech 
government in fact will or is even likely to suppress if allowed to 
suppress hate speech. Rather, I am claiming that expression that 
proponents of hate speech bans likely would want protected is 
fairly encompassed within various rationales they proffer to 
support the suppression of hate speech.233 If I am right about 
this, then those who have offered such an overly capacious 
rationale should consider retracting it, not because it might in 
fact lead via a slippery slope to the suppression of speech that 
they think should be protected, but because it shows that the 
rationale is faulty.234 Relatedly, these rationales should also be 
rejected because they unduly weaken a democratic nation’s free 
speech principle.235  
 
 232. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545 (1951) (“The defendants have 
been convicted of conspiring to organize a party of persons who advocate the overthrow 
of the Government by force and violence [by using] language reasonably and ordinarily 
calculated to incite persons to such action, and with the intent to cause the overthrow as 
speedily as circumstances would permit. On any scale of values which we have hitherto 
recognized, speech of this sort ranks low.”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks 
removed). In response to the argument that the government could easily squelch any 
resurrection that such advocacy might provoke, the plurality noted the harm that even 
unsuccessful attempts “create both physically and politically to a notion . . . .” Id. at 509). 
I agree with Shiffrin that in the United States the Ku Klux Klan far more effectively 
promoted “governmental illegitimacy” than did the American Communist Party. See 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 678 n.16. But in other mature, stable democracies the threat of 
communist subversion and thus promotion of “governmental illegitimacy” might be 
greater than it was in the United States. In any event, that the harms created by racist 
organizations might be marginally worse than those from radical political ones seems too 
fine a distinction to provide the protection that should be afforded all forms of dissent in 
a free and democratic society. 
 233. For further discussion of the distinction between a slippery slope argument and 
an argument about the breadth of a rationale, see James Weinstein, A Constitutional 
Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 184 (1991). 
 234. This does not mean, of course, that hate speech bans are not vulnerable to valid 
slippery slope concerns. For a discussion of the mechanism of the slippery slope problem 
of banning hate speech in the United States, see Post, supra note 92, at 315–17. 
 235. My complaint about the breadth of rationales for suppressing hate speech is in 
one way essentially connected to a slippery slope concern. Embracing a rationale that 
will allow the suppression of speech that should be permitted in a free and democratic 
society will make suppression of such speech more likely. And indeed, in my view and 
those of others, European democracies, including Britain, have for decades inadequately 
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F. EXPANDING THE INQUIRY 
Robert Post’s Commentary provides a useful supplement to 
my analysis. Although briefly discussing how viewpoint-based 
speech restrictions, including hate speech bans, can damage 
systemic legitimacy,236 the burden of my Opening Article was to 
explore the potential of hate speech bans to damage the 
normative legitimacy of particular downstream laws. Robert 
Post’s Commentary, in contrast, focuses on how speech 
restrictions might impair the descriptive legitimacy of the legal 
system. In this way, Post usefully expands the discussion.  
I agree with Post that freedom of speech “allow[s] persons 
of widely varying views to experience as legitimate a government 
that may nevertheless act in ways that are inconsistent with their 
own ideas” and that if “persons are prevented from expressing 
their own views—however much others might find those views 
outrageous and intolerable—then they are less likely to 
experience their government as legitimate.”237 I also agree with 
him that hate speech bans restricting the abusive manner in 
which bigoted ideas can be expressed in public discourse can 
significantly damage systemic legitimacy in the descriptive sense 
by alienating people from the legal system. But this is not 
primarily, as Post suggests, because such restrictions even if 
properly applied to punish only bigoted ideas expressed in a 
higly abusive manner,238 would interfere with these speakers’ 
ability to influence “the shape of public opinion” to which “their 
representatives are supposed to be responsive.”239 As I discuss 
above, I think that Post overestimates the extent to which 
limitations on “abusive language” interfere with speakers’ ability 
 
protected free speech in ways beyond hate speech bans, a problem which seems to have 
worsened in the last few years. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Jacob 
Mchangama, Europe’s Freedom of Speech Fail, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 7, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/07/europes-freedom-of-speech-fail/. I am not sure what 
role hate speech bans have played in enfeebling the protection of speech in these 
democracies. I suspect the causation is bidirectional, with initial weakness in overall free 
speech protection allowing the enactment of hate speech bans which in turn further 
weakened the protection of free speech. 
 236. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 678 n.16. 
 237. Post, supra note 3, at 656–57. 
 238. As I have shown, however, even if Waldron is correct that the typical hate 
speech law is meant to target only highly vituperative expression such laws have been 
misapplied to cover temperate expression some of which is arguably not even bigoted. 
See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–61. Such misapplication will definitely interfere with 
the speaker’s and would-be speakers’ ability to influence “the shape of public opinion.” 
 239. Post, supra note 3, at 655. 
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to express the precise idea they wish to disseminate.240 Rather, it 
is primarily the selective nature of these prohibitions that in my 
view is likely to damage descriptive legitimacy. This is because 
limitations on the abusive manner of expression applicable to 
hate speech, but not to other types of abusive expression in 
public discourse, are likely to be perceived by bigots as an unfair 
attempt to muzzle them, but not opponents of equality. In 
addition, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized,241 
speech has an emotive as well as a cognitive function.242 
Accordingly, regardless of any impairment that they may have 
on speakers’ ability to “influence the shape of public opinion,” 
laws that prohibit participants in public discourse from 
employing abusive language to vehemently express a viewpoint 
might interfere with speakers’ “experienc[ing] as legitimate a 
government that might nevertheless act in ways that are 
inconsistent with their own ideas.”243 
Post and I are in accord that “democratic legitimacy is at 
stake on both sides of the equation” in that such legitimacy is 
adversely affected by the simple act of prohibiting hate speech 
but depending on “the particularities of national circumstances” 
legitimacy can also be undermined by allowing hate 
speech . . . .”244 But it may be that Post’s view of the potential of 
hate speech to damage descriptive political legitimacy is 
somewhat greater than I conceive it to be. In Post’s view 
descriptive legitimacy concerns the “conditions necessary for a 
diverse and heterogeneous population to live together in a 
 
 240. Id. at 656. For this reason I concluded that if such restrictions on vituperation 
could in practice be limited in the way Waldron supposes they are, the damage to 
normative legitimacy would be minimal, though perhaps not as trivial as Waldron 
suggests. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551. 
 241. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 242. Shiffrin writes that I claim that racists have a First Amendment interest in 
expressing bigoted ideas as a way of “feel[ing] better.” Shiffrin, supra note 3 at 678 n.16 
(citing Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551). Shiffrin is wrong that I was claiming here that 
racists or anyone else have a constitutionally significant interest in participating in public 
discourse so as to “feel better.” Rather, I was arguing that contrary to Waldron’s claim 
that the purpose of racist speech is to make vulnerable minorities unsure of their status in 
society, another reason that bigots might engage in racist rants in public discourse is not 
so much “to make minorities feel bad . . . but to make [themselves] feel better.” 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551. Interestingly, however, the emotive function of public 
discourse emphasized by the Court in Cohen would seem to recognize something at least 
akin to a First Amendment interest in participating in public discourse to “feel better,” 
including by using offensive or abusive language to express an idea. 
 243. Post, supra note 3, at 656. 
 244. Id. at 658. 
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relatively peaceable manner under a common system of 
governance and politics.”245 On this specification, expression that 
impedes the goal of such a population “liv[ing] together in a 
relatively peaceable manner,” an effect that hate speech might 
well have in various societies, would damage legitimacy even if it 
did not prevent anyone from participating in the democratic 
process. Such intergroup conflict is a serious harm that should be 
accounted for in any assessment of the propriety of hate speech 
laws in a free and democratic society. I am not sure, however, it 
should be counted as a detriment to political legitimacy, at least 
not without further explanation. 
Vincent Blasi’s superb Commentary begins by meticulously, 
accurately and fairly summarizing the essence of both Waldron’s 
and my positions in our debate about hate speech regulation and 
political legitimacy. It then points out what he considers to be 
the strengths and weaknesses of both of our positions.246 I am 
enormously grateful to Blasi for taking the time and care to 
understand what I was trying to accomplish in my Opening 
Article.247 
Blasi kindly credits my argument as offering a “fresh 
account of why viewpoint discrimination might be problematic” 
in arguing that viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on public 
discourse offend the basic democratic premise that each person 
in society has “equal civic standing.”248 He notes that on this 
account “viewpoint discrimination is not about the quality of 
public debate,” as posited by Professor Geoffrey Stone, or about 
“the rightful sources of governmental authority,” as emphasized 
by Judge Learned Hand. Rather, Blasi correctly observes that 
my indictment of viewpoint discrimination derives from “the 
equal treatment of individuals,” which entails “[r]espect for the 
civic dignity of each individual speaker.”249 
 
 245. Id. at 651. 
 246. Blasi, supra note 3. 
 247. In a previous Symposium in which Blasi, Post and I participated, Post wrote of 
Blasi’s commentary on his target article: “Professor Vincent Blasi most generously 
catches the fundamental aspiration of my own work . . . .” Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy as A Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 627 (2011). I feel 
the same way about Blasi’s generous effort to understand the “fundamental aspiration” 
of my Opening Article in this Symposium. 
 248. Blasi, supra note 3, at 593–94. 
 249. Id. at 594. 
11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:59 AM 
2017] HATE SPEECH SYMPOSIUM: A REPLY 779 
 
Blasi accurately notes that any answer I might have to 
Waldron’s “powerful critique” of my claim that upstream hate 
speech restrictions can deprive downstream antidiscrimination 
laws of legitimacy has to come from my equality-based rationale 
for impugning viewpoint discrimination.250 He comes to no 
conclusion, however, about whether this rationale provides 
sufficient support for my “imaginative legitimation argument, 
which Waldron has questioned effectively.”251 Rather, he thinks I 
have a “more straightforward line of support” from my case 
against hate speech regulation, namely, an argument based 
directly on equal civic standing.252 Such an argument, in Blasi’s 
view, would have the advantage of being commensurable with 
Waldron’s argument that hate speech undercuts the civic dignity 
of members of vulnerable minority groups.253 
Blasi does not decide whether the insult to civic dignity 
wrought by hate speech bans is justified by the protection of 
civic dignity it produces but rather offers some observations 
about the “variables” that might be used in such an analysis.254 
Except for some reservations about his claim that “the most 
important value at stake in the comparison” is freedom of 
thought,255 I agree that the approach Blasi suggests would be 
fruitful. But more importantly, I applaud Blasi for building on 
what he generously referred to as a “promising line of inquiry” 
opened up in the debate between Waldron and me to expand the 
discussion in a useful direction. 
CONCLUSION 
It has long been recognized that free speech promotes the 
legitimacy of a legal system. This is one important reason that 
free speech is highly valued in liberal democracies. It also 
explains why a proliferation of laws that impede the ability of 
 
 250. Id. at 592. As indeed it does. See supra text accompanying notes 37–39. 
 251. Blasi, supra note 3, at 593–94. 
 252. Id. What such direct reliance on equal citizenship sacrifices, however, is the 
legitimating function of free speech, especially as it relates to justifying the government’s 
use of force to make people comply with laws with which they reasonably disagree. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 554. 
 255. I have previously expressed concern about positing freedom of thought as the 
basis of American free speech doctrine. See James Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s Thinker-
Based Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful, But Will It Work in Practice, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2011). 
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citizens to express their views on matters of public concern 
would substantially impair the legitimacy of a legal system. But 
as crucial as free speech is to political legitimacy, it cannot 
plausibly be argued that even the most egregious law restricting 
free speech that realistically might be enacted in a mature and 
stable democracy could destroy or even severely damage the 
legitimacy of the entire legal system.256 Rather, given the level of 
legitimacy that these democracies enjoy, even the most poorly-
justified speech restriction likely to be enacted will usually only 
reduce the legal system’s legitimacy “reservoir” by some barely 
perceptible amount.257 For this reason, those who favor 
restraining speech that they believe inimical to some goal, policy 
or value that they care passionately about will likely conclude, at 
least so far as legitimacy is concerned, that banning such speech 
is well worth the miniscule reduction in the legal system’s ample 
legitimacy reserve.258 
In contrast, unlike the negligible damage that a single 
speech restriction can inflict on the systemic legitimacy of a 
mature and stable democracy, the harm to the legitimacy of 
particular downstream laws resulting from an upstream speech 
restriction can be considerable, sometimes even ruinous. Of 
course, such damage to legitimacy, both descriptive and 
normative, will be more likely if the speech restriction is 
dramatically lacking in justification. But as my Evangelical 
Photographer scenario and some actual cases I discuss reveal,259 
this palpable damage to legitimacy can sometimes result even if 
the speech restriction is, as I believe is the case with many hate 
 
 256. At least this is true of normative legitimacy, my primary concern in this 
Symposium. With respect to descriptive legitimacy, it may be that a speech restriction 
might for some individuals destroy any sense of political obligation they have to the legal 
system. 
 257. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 148–49 
(1971). 
 258. In this way, the relationship between free speech and political legitimacy is not 
unlike the relationship between junk food and health. While a steady diet of greasy 
hamburgers and fries will over time likely have a deleterious, sometimes even fatal, effect 
on one’s health, fortunately for those of us who on very rare occasions like to eat a Big 
Mac or the like, one such meal, or even two or three a year, will for otherwise healthy 
people not lead to such baneful results. Unfortunately, another characteristic that both 
poorly-justified speech restrictions and consumption of junk food have in common is that 
one indulgence tends to lead to another. 
 259. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 567–74. 
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speech laws on the books, not “indefensible”260 but merely on 
balance unjustified. 
So did this novel take on the relationship between free 
speech and political legitimacy, developed beyond cursory 
statements for the first time in this Symposium, survive the 
intense scrutiny to which it was subjected by the Response and 
eight Commentaries? To my mind, the most powerful objection 
was the contention that if a speech restriction was justified, it 
could not deprive a downstream law of normative legitimacy. As 
I explained, I am not sure that this objection is valid, especially 
when the iterative nature of a legal justification is considered. 
But even if the objection is correct, the idea I defended 
nonetheless serves to reveal a previously unidentified cost of 
unjustified speech restrictions. In addition, this objection has no 
bearing on the damage to descriptive legitimacy that can result 
from even justified viewpoint-discriminatory speech restrictions. 
In contrast, the other objections did not take issue with my 
basic contention that speech restrictions that unduly prevent 
people from expressing their views in public discourse can 
compromise, both normatively and descriptively, the legitimacy 
of downstream legislation.261 Rather, this criticism focused on my 
claim about the scope and extent of the impediment imposed by 
hate speech bans on the expression of bigoted viewpoints in 
public discourse; on my assessment of the potential for hate 
speech itself to undermine political legitimacy; and on the proper 
legal response in the absence of any persuasive evidence that 
hate speech prevents the subjects of such speech from 
participating in the political process. I am content to leave open 
for now the question of whether hate speech laws as they 
currently operate in many democracies damage the legitimacy of 
downstream laws, particularly antidiscrimination measures, and 
 
 260. See supra note 104. 
 261. The one exception was Jeremy Waldron’s critique which doubted that legal 
restrictions on the “chaotic and unformed” public debate can have the direct 
consequences for legitimacy that I claim they can, Waldron, supra note 2, at 709, and 
simultaneously pressed the view that voting for one’s representative was the primary way 
that legislation was legitimized. Id. at 708. I agree that under such a parsimonious view 
about the relative importance of free speech to political legitimacy, it would be difficult 
to make the case that speech restrictions can seriously damage or even destroy the 
legitimacy of certain applications of downstream laws. But not only is Waldron’s view 
normatively unappealing, it also does not accurately describe free speech as it operates in 
contemporary liberal democracies. See Post, supra note 3, at 654–55. 
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if so, the extent to which this loss of legitimacy might be offset by 
increased participation in public discourse by the subjects of hate 
speech. What I hope that I have demonstrated in this 
Symposium is that a law that restricts the right of citizens to 
express particular views in public discourse—be it a hate speech 
ban, a blasphemy law, a prohibition on anti-war speech, or a law 
that forbids advocacy of radical political change—can impair, 
and in rare cases even destroy, the legitimacy of downstream 
laws. 
 
